

THE IMPACT OF ISRAELI TECHNICAL AND MILITARY AID ON THE INTERNAL
POLITICS OF TWO AFRICAN NATIONS: GHANA AND UGANDA

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BY
MARCELLA G. WASHINGTON

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The ability of imperialist nations to infiltrate and impose their values and desires on newly independent nations on the continent of Africa should never be underestimated. While the more vulgar means of control, such as direct rule and colonization have been relinquished in the 20th century, newer aspects of aggression are covered up, hidden and filed under the concept 'neo-colonialism'. In clear terms, all aspects of imperialism are not unmasked. The problem then becomes what 'game' will the capitalist nations use next to continue their control over African nations. It can be suggested that if not assured of continued support in Africa by those leaders and regimes hand-picked and held up by Western imperialism, these Western powers may resort to the use of a 'third' force to insure and secure their control of the continent.

In 1967 the Africa Research Group published a pamphlet on exactly one of these 'third' forces; namely Israel. It analyzed the impact that Israel has had on African nations. The Group asserts that the role Israel has played in Africa is a relatively invisible but strategically important one for the United States' organized free world empire. Thus, it is not surprising that the Group should discover:

U. S. imperialism uses Israeli diplomatic military and development institutions to further its own objectives of tying post independence Africa to the West and undermining revolutionary

movements which threaten Western hegemony. Israel's own long range political and economic goals have been strengthened by foreign aid-programmes in at least 15 African countries.¹

Israel shares the unique distinction, together with a handful of other nations, of being a 'newsworthy' country. Various references to Israel are made daily in both Western and Eastern presses. On a per capita basis, no other country receives as much world press coverage as Israel. However, very few articles and fewer books present a competent analysis of Israel's foreign policy and its role in world politics. And if the area of concentration is narrowed to Israel's involvement with Africa, the paucity of first-rate work is even more evident.

Consequently, an attempt will be made to assess the literature on Israeli relations with Africa with a special emphasis on Israeli aid to Africa.

Such Western writers as M. Z. Frank, Walter Schwartz, Leo Kohn and Hanen Yavor have done extensive work in the area of Israeli foreign relations. In general, these authors have done studies on Israel's role in the Third World. For example, M. Z. Frank did a very intensive study on Israeli aid in his article "Israel's Afro-Asian Bridge."² Like Schwartz's "Israel Goes Afro-Asian",³ Frank's article attempted to place the role that Israel is playing in developing countries in a very positive light. He portrays Israel as a small, benevolent nation which dispenses aid to

¹Africa Research Group, "David and Goliath Collaborate in Africa," p. 5. Reprinted from Tri Continental, (November 15, 1969).

²M. Z. Frank, "Israel's Afro-Asian Bridge," New Leader (London) March 7, 1960.

³Walter Schwartz, "Israel Goes Afro-Asian," The Spectator, (London) January, 1959.

poor, underdeveloped areas with no strings attached.

As would be expected, there have been frequent references to Israel's African policy in the Israeli domestic press. Most of these works, however, are in Hebrew. Ehud Avriel, the former Israeli Ambassador to Ghana and David Horowitz, President of the Bank of Israel have done studies on Israel's role in Africa. One could view for instance, Avriel's article in the Jerusalem Post (daily) of September 30, 1960. This article, coupled with his analysis of Israel's relations with Africa and Asia and Horowitz's "Israel and the Developing Nations" all serve to highlight positive aspects of Israeli aid to the Third World.⁴ In most of his writings, Avriel attempts to align Israel with the Third World in general and Africa in particular. At one time, he was one of the most influential people in Ghana and it was rumored that he often dictated domestic and foreign policy decisions to Nkrumah.⁵

Yitzhak Artzi⁶ and Victor Cygielman have concluded in their studies on Israeli foreign policy that Israel is attempting to portray a new image in Africa. Commenting on the need of Israel to find allies in the Third World, both authors conclude that Israel must break some of its ties with the West and align itself closer with the ambitions of developing states.⁷

⁴See for example, Ehud Avriel, "Israel's Interest in New Africa," Jerusalem Post (daily) September 30, 1960; "Israel, Africa and Asia," Israel Economist (Tel Aviv) July, 1961; "Israel's Relations with Africa and Asia," Israel Economist, July, 1962. David Horowitz, "Israel and the Developing Nations," Jerusalem Post Weekly, December 3, 1965.

⁵See W. Scott Thompson's Ghana's Foreign Policy: 1957-1966 (Princeton, 1969), pp. 48-58.

⁶Yitzhak Artzi, "Changes in Israeli Foreign Policy," New Outlook, September, 1963, 14-19.

⁷Victor Cygielman, "Can Israel go Neutralist?" New Outlook, October, 1964, 18-25.

Another factor in Israel's foreign policy changes is its relations with South Africa. Several decisions to vote along with the African nations in condemning Israel brought sharp criticism for Israel by South Africa.

Richard Stevens of Lincoln University, has done some of the most ambitious work to date on Israeli-South African relations. Although it has been pointed out that Israel began to alter its policies toward South Africa after it gained close ties with other African states; Stevens points to the closeness of the original relationship.

Going beyond the position of other countries that are favorable to Israel, Malan not only permitted Jewish reserve officers to serve in Israel, a procedure officially contrary to law, but he became the first Prime Minister in the British Commonwealth to pay a courtesy visit to the new state. When, despite serious financial problems then facing South Africa, the government permitted the exports of much needed commodities and currency to Israel, Malan's victory with the Jewish community was complete.

Thereafter, the Jewish South African community would send more money per capita to Israel than any Jewish group in the world.⁸

In general, the published material on Israel's programmes of technical cooperation with Africa is more extensive than the general Israeli African foreign relations material. The Department of International Cooperation in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Israel publishes voluminous official documents every year. Colored with a pro-Israeli government line, these reports and documents include topics on the following areas: Trainees in Israel in the year 1961 (1962); Programme of Coopera-

⁸ Richard P. Stevens, "Zionism, South Africa and Apartheid: The Paradoxical Triangle," Phylon (Second Quarter, 1971), 17-18.

tion with Countries of East Africa (1962); Israel's Programme for Training Opportunities (1962); Programme for Itinerat Courses in Africa (1962); and Israel's Programme of International Co-operation (1971).

One of the best organized studies on the Israeli programmes is Mordechai Kreinin's Israel and Africa: A Study in Technical Co-operation. The book contains chapters on such facets of Israeli technical assistance as youth organization, health, joint companies and labor organization. However, the author strongly supports a pro-Zionist line throughout the work. Attempting to present Israel in a favorable light, Kreinin has written that Israel's absence of colonial ambition is an "enabling condition." However, without a content of social values and technical skills, it would not be sufficient to attract the interest of African government. He also states that perhaps the first phenomenon which catches the eye of visiting delegations to Israel is the non-dogmatic socialism evolved by the Jewish community in Palestine and continued in Israel. At the same time, they recognize the need to encourage any private (domestic or foreign) initiative that might emerge.⁹

The establishment of national agrarian centered, youth organizations aimed at the promotion of civic consciousness has been one of the major emphases of Israel's programmes of technical co-operation. These organizations titled Nachal and Gadna were transferred to over a dozen nations during the early '60's. Possibly the most comprehensive coverage of these Israeli structures is to be found in articles written by C. Rossillion¹⁰

⁹ Mordechai E. Kreinin, Israel and Africa: A Study in Technical Cooperation (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 5.

¹⁰ C. Rossillion, "Economic and Social Work for Young People During Defense Service: The Israeli Formula," International Labor Review (Geneva) (January, 1966), 66-79.

and Irving Hegmont.¹¹ Both authors give a detailed study of these youth movements and their possible impact on African states.

Limiting the study of the Nachal-Gadna programmes to Ghana; several works have been written. What was to become a Ghanaian hybrid of the Israeli Nachal is briefly noted in an article by Colin Legum.¹² Peter Hodge analyzes the Ghanaian organization in much greater depth in his article. Hodge asserts that the Ghanaian model served as a useful force in Ghana for the orientation of youth.¹³

Trade union cooperation and the mass training of many African union leaders is yet another project stressed by Israel. The Histadrut model, widely admired in the developing countries has served as a model for the reorganization of certain trade union federations in these countries. The best works in these areas include Samuel Decalo's dissertation, "Israel and Africa: The Politics of Co-operation—A Study of Foreign Policy and Technical Assistance."¹⁴ This is a well organized work which explains the nature of Israeli aid in African nations with particular emphasis on the role that imperialism plays. Another important, although somewhat uncoordinated work is Joseph Churba's doctoral dissertation, "U.A.R.—Israel

¹¹Irving Hegmont, "The Israeli Nachal Program," Middle East Journal, (Summer, 1967), 314-24.

¹²Colin Legum, "Ghana Starts Builders Brigade," Jerusalem Post, December 22, 1957.

¹³Peter Hodge, "The Ghana Workers Brigade," British Journal of Sociology (June, 1964).

¹⁴Samuel Decalo, "Israel and Africa: The Politics of Co-operation—A Study of Foreign Policy and Technical Assistance," Doctoral Dissertation. (University of Pennsylvania, 1967).

Rivalry Over Aid and Trade in Sub-Saharan Africa."¹⁵

Samuel Decalo has done a well written account of the total Israeli-African aid structure. Running 15 pages and listing all of the material up until 1967 on Israeli aid to Africa, Decalo gives insight into the literature published on this subject during 1958-67. For a sample of his writings on the subject it would be useful to read his bibliography.¹⁶ At the present time, it holds the wealth of information and directives to scholars who are seriously interested in the Middle East and Africa in general and Israeli-African relations in particular.

All in all, Israeli diplomatic efforts in Africa between 1956-70 brought about an immense improvement in the international position of Israel. The growing amity for Israel on the part of Africa, had by 1958 grown tremendously. For example, Afro-Israeli cooperation in the United Nations appreciably dulled Arab anti-Israel propaganda in that organization. By 1961, a number of important resolutions sponsored by countries from the Third World with a significant African participation called for direct negotiations in the Middle East. Even more important is the fact that by 1966 Israel found herself elected to a number of executive positions in United Nations agencies as the representative of the whole of Afro-Asia. Needless to say, such cooperation has not been one-sided. Israel has had to modify certain of her positions on African affairs.

This thesis is an attempt to analyze the role that the Israeli aid programmes, both technical and military, have played in two African nations,

¹⁵ Joseph Churba, "U.A.R.—Israeli Rivalry Over Aid and Trade in Sub-Saharan Africa," Doctoral Dissertation (Columbia University, 1965).

¹⁶ Samuel Decalo, "Israel and Africa: A Selected Bibliography," The Journal of Modern African Studies, V (1967), 385-99.

Ghana and Uganda. The basic hypothesis of this thesis is that Israel is used as a go-between or buffer for imperialist nations vis-a-vis the Third World. In the specific case of Africa, Israel has been effectively used by Western nations in setting up closer ties between African nations and Western powers.

In an attempt to devise a framework for explaining the nature of the Israeli aid programme in Africa specifically and in the Third World in general, three major premises will be examined:

1. Israeli aid to Africa was and is an instrument of Western imperialism. The guiding principle being that Western countries finance programmes through Israel to Third World nations.
2. Israel's general interest in African nations is grounded in the need to find political allies in the Third World, and at the same time, discredit the Arab nations so that African states would give support to Israel in the Middle East conflict.
3. Israel's aid programme in Africa helps the Israeli economy.

In citing several reasons why Israel has ventured upon such a broad technical and military programme in the Third World in general one author notes that:

In 1967, Israel Companies carried construction and public works in the developing countries to the tune of \$55 million. Of course, such large-scale activity stimulated the export of Israel's products, particularly building materials, to the countries where work was being executed. Israel's exports to developing nations rose from \$50 million in 1961 to \$114 million in 1967. While admitting that these business ventures were profitable to Israel, the author took pains to note that these ventures were by no means a decisive element in Israel's policy.¹⁷

This thesis will take opposition with this general view and will attempt to show that Israel's role in Africa was beneficial to the Israeli

¹⁷David Horowitz, "Israel and Africa," (Special Pamphlet), January 1960. Cited in Israel's Programmed for Training Opportunities (Jerusalem: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1962), p. 37.

economy and a decisive factor in the origin of the aid programme.

A considerable amount of literature has been written on Israeli aid to developing nations. However, there is little work on the impact of Israeli aid to the policies of African nations. And, there is no systematic study of Israeli aid programmes in specific countries in the Third World.

The nations considered in this study are Ghana and Uganda. The reason for using these two nations is to show the divergent policies Israel employed in different nations in Africa.

Ghana is used because it was the first Black nation on the continent to break away from colonial rule. The role that Ghana played in Africa's emerging independence must be attributed to the leadership of Kwame Nkrumah; the nation's first President. Through his writings reflecting the ideals of freedom and anti-colonialism, Nkrumah was often looked upon as the spokesman for African unity. Not only was Ghana the first African nation to set up an aid programme with Israel, but the impact of this programme radiated to other African nations. Therefore, we will have two aspects to consider vis-a-vis Israeli aid. First of all the personality of Kwame Nkrumah, secondly the role of Ghana's aid programme with Israel. This thesis will limit its inquiry of Ghana to the years of the Nkrumah administration. This is important because the Israelis had a pronounced influence throughout Africa during this period (1958-1965).

Uganda is the second nation that will be examined in this study. Notwithstanding the contemporary role that President Idi Amin has played in world and African politics; Israel and Uganda up until 1971 had strong ties. It is interesting to scrutinize Israeli-Ugandan relations because it will focus on not one but two distinct African personalities. Former

President Milton Obote and President Idi Amin Dada will be examined in the role that they served in the Israeli aid structure. At one time Uganda was considered a suitable place for the restoration of the Jewish people and this factor makes it interesting to view Israeli relations with Uganda. It should also be noted that Uganda does have a sizeable Moslem population and Israel's entry in this area could have been viewed as a hammer blow to Arab states.

This study constitutes an historical inquiry. A thorough survey of the literature on Israeli aid to Africa will be made in order to analyze and assess the total range of Israel's growing interest in Africa. Books, articles, newspapers, journals and official documents will be used to collect data for the study which will attempt to show the linkages between Israeli aid and world imperialism.

CHAPTER II

ZIONISM: AN ARM OF WESTERN IMPERIALISM

The birth of the Zionist State of Israel in May of 1948 was fostered in the origin of the political Zionist movement which swept Europe in the last decade of the 19th century. To be sure, this form of Zionism differed from other aspects of the ideology. While most Zionists were calling for any geographic area in the world for Jewish settlement; the new leaders of Zionism totally rejected this idea. The unique factor in this new movement was that there was only one solution to the problem of the Jewish people, that being: the establishment in Palestine of an exclusively Jewish State.

The initial success of Zionism can be traced directly to the economic, political and ideological conditions existing in Europe at the end of the nineteenth century. Arie Bober has pointed out some significant aspects of Zionism and several of his points are worth noting here.

Economically, in the less industrialized countries like Poland and Russia, there were new social stresses that were coming to fore. These forces arose from the rapid development of capitalism and the decay of the Austrian and Russian empires. These factors led to the uprooting of the Jews from their traditional occupations. The Jews became the scapegoat in the declining feudal systems to divert the peasants' hostilities into channels of racial persecution. These processes resulted in a huge

wave of Jewish immigration from eastern and central Europe—some five million immigrated to America and other areas, a few thousand went to Palestine. At the same time in western Europe, where Jews were mostly merchants and members of the middle class the pressures of economic competition made it increasingly difficult for them to integrate into local bourgeois society and forced them to create their own institutions.¹

Politically, the capitalist development of nineteenth-century Europe brought to the fore two distinct political phenomena; one was nationalism and the other was the quest for colonization of the underdeveloped continents. Zionism arose and took shape under the influence of these two phenomena. It was the nationalist response to the problem created by persecution of the Jews. It also proposed to create a national Jewish state by colonizing underdeveloped territory.²

Ideologically, these two objectives were to be reflected in the consciousness of many East European Jews in a distinctive national ideology. The new ideology was able to incorporate and secularize an element of the traditional religious belief of the Jews—the messianic expectation of the ingathering of the exiles in Palestine.³

The founder of the modern day Zionist movement was Theodor Herzl; an Austrian Jew. Herzl grew up and received his high school training in Budapest. At the age of eighteen, his family moved to Vienna where he enrolled in the University. Upon gaining his doctorate in 1884, he prac-

¹ Arie Bober, ed., The Other Israel: The Radical Case Against Zionism (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1972), p. 36.

² Ibid., p. 36.

³ Ibid.

ticed law for one year and then gave up law to devote his time to writing. He soon became well known as a famous journalist. His appointment in 1892 to the staff of the Neue Freie Presse, the most important Viennese newspaper, marked the beginning of his Zionist leadership.

As the resident correspondent to Paris for the newspaper; Herzl was shocked by the 1894 Alfred Dreyfus affair. Dreyfus, a Jewish Captain serving with the French General Staff was accused of spying for the Germans.⁴ Herzl had the task of relating the Dreyfus trial to his paper in Vienna. In his book, The Zionist Idea, Arthur Hertzberg examined the effect of the outcome of the trial on Herzl.

He was present at the Ecole Militaire at the famous dramatic scene when Dreyfus was stripped of his epulets and drummed out of the gate in disgrace. For Herzl this moment was a hammer blow, and the howling of the mob outside the parade ground shouting "a bas les jifs" transformed him into the Zionist he was to be.⁵

In 1896, Herzl published Der Judenstat (The Jewish State). In the preface he wrote: "The idea which I have developed in this pamphlet is an ancient one. It is the restoration of the Jewish State."⁶ Throughout this work, Hertzl asserted the basic need for a Jewish State. He apparently regarded the idea as an excellent one. Convinced that Jews could not receive justice and equality in the nations of the world; he steadily pursued the idea of a separate, distinct Jewish nation.

Herzl believed that the Jews could never achieve such a dream without

⁴Dreyfus was given a verdict of guilty to the charges of spying for the Germans. Herzl's entire portrayal of the trial to his newspaper was one of an act of direct discrimination and persecution of the Jewish people by the French.

⁵Arthur Hertzberg, ed., The Zionist Idea (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1959), p. 202.

⁶Ibid., p. 202.

the help of outsiders. Thus he points out:

To create a new State is neither ridiculous nor impossible. Haven't we witnessed the process in our own day among other nations which were not largely middle class as we are, but poorer, less educated, and consequently weaker than ourselves? The government of all countries scourged by anti-semitism will be keenly interested in obtaining sovereignty for us.⁷

In his conclusion, he cited two places which the Jews might find suitable for settlement. The first was Argentina. For his part, Herzl believed that the Republic of Argentina should cede a portion of its territory to the Jews.⁸ He requested an interview with Baron Maurice de Hirsch, the founder of the Jewish Colonization Society in Argentina. Receiving very little support for this idea from de Hirsch; Herzl focused upon his second alternative: the establishment of the Jewish State in Palestine. Thus Herzl writes:

Palestine is our unforgettable historic homeland. The very name would be a marvelously effective rallying cry. If His Majesty the Sultan, were to give us Palestine, we would in return undertake the complete management of the finances of Turkey. We should there form a part of a wall of defense for Europe in Asia, an outpost for civilization against barbarism. We should as a neutral state remain in contact with Europe, which would have to guarantee our existence.⁹

In order, therefore, to understand how the Zionist dream of a Jewish

⁷ Ibid., p. 220.

⁸ As regards Argentina, Herzl once remarked, "Argentina is one of the most fertile countries in the world, extends over a vast area, is sparsely populated, and has a temperate climate. It would be in its own interest for the Republic of Argentina to cede us its territory. The present infiltration of Jews has certainly produced some discontent, and it would be necessary to enlighten the Republic on the intrinsic differences of the new immigration of Jews." Cited in Hertzberg, The Zionist Idea, p. 222.

⁹ Ibid., p. 222.

state in Palestine became a reality, it is necessary to understand the relationship between Zionism and western imperialism and the great potential and ability of the Zionists to court western powers.

Since its inception, the general guiding principle of Zionist diplomacy was to associate itself with the world power within whose sphere of influence Palestine happened to be.¹⁰ Herzl was mainly interested in gaining the support of the Turkish Sultan and the German Kaiser. Once Palestine became a British mandate after World War I; Zionists courted British imperialism. After the Second World War, the orientation of Zionism was bent toward the interest of the United States.¹¹ Before his death in 1904, Herzl was to resound the words that would in fact be a reality in 1948: "The world needs the Jewish State, therefore, it will arise."¹²

Although there were certain factions of Jews who differed over the practical policy and ideology that Zionism would entail; all factions agreed to be silent on the question of Jewish sovereignty itself and the political means to achieve it.¹³ The urgent political task in the 1880's

¹⁰Bober, Op. cit., p. 37.

¹¹Ibid., p. 56.

¹²Marvin Lowenthal, ed., The Diaries of Theodor Herzl (New York: The Dial Press, 1956), p. 27.

¹³Richard Stevens points out that in 1882 three Zionists inspired groups arrived in Palestine from Rumania and Poland. He stated that immediately there developed a conflict between Zionist ideology and the Western European Jewish-sponsored operations. "Although Western Jews and political Zionists came to terms on some issues relating to the strengthening, expansion and development of Jewish settlements in Palestine, serious if not bitter divisions developed in other areas. Richard P. Stevens, Zionism and Palestine Before The Mandate: A Phase of Western Imperialism (Beirut: The Institute for Palestine Studies, 1972), pp. 7-8.

and '90's was one which fell far short of the Zionist ideal and yet was fundamental to the activities of both Eastern Zionists and the Western Jews: merely to keep the doors of Palestine open to Jewish immigrants and to procure the right to buy land and settle it. All were agreed in their willingness to adopt any legal or semi-legal arrangement or subterfuge that would accomplish these ends in the Ottoman Empire.¹⁴

The mere fact that Palestine itself was already populated by Arabs hardly figured in the early discussions of political Zionism. At the First World Zionist Congress held in Basle, Switzerland in 1897; the Zionists gathered from all over the world to discuss the plan for a Jewish State. Prior to this time, Herzl had not faltered in his efforts to engage upon enlisting imperial German and Russian support; Herzl was convinced that in terms of success: "the most suitable personage would be the German Kaiser." "But", he remarked, "I must have help if I am to carry out the task."¹⁵ Elected president of the World Zionist Organization, Herzl's ideas emerged in a resolution calling for a publicly recognized, legally secured state in Palestine.

Because Palestine was under the rule of the Ottoman Empire and at a time when Germany was drawing close to the Ottoman Empire; Herzl and other Zionists felt it imperative to court Germany. As one writer points out:

Following his visit to Constantinople in mid-October, 1898 and a meeting there with Herzl, Kaiser Wilhelm II went on to Palestine. Although the trip was ostensibly undertaken as a religious pilgrimage, it turned into a political demonstration in tune with German strategy to penetrate the Near East. However, although

¹⁴Ibid., p. 10.

¹⁵Lowenthal, Op. cit., p. 105.

Herzl accompanied the royal party and entertained high hopes of German support, it soon became apparent that such a scheme was beyond German [sic] capability.¹⁶

The fact that Germany lacked the power to complete the designs of the Zionists proved only to the Zionists that they should find greener political pastures. What Germany could not do or failed to do, Great Britain was willing to try. Thus Zionism found a willing partner in its plan to rob the Palestinians of their land. Becoming increasingly alarmed by the large influx of Jewish refugees to England from Russia, the British government sought to examine the question of alien immigration. In 1898, the British government was presided over by Arthur Balfour. Herzl immediately petitioned Balfour and Joseph Chamberlain, the Colonial Secretary for an audience to explain his plan for a Jewish state. Herzl found Chamberlain receptive, for indeed, Chamberlain admitted that he was willing to help if he could. "If I could show him a spot among the British possessions which was not yet inhabited by white settlers, then we could talk,"¹⁷ Herzl remarked of Chamberlain.

Chamberlain advanced the Zionist cause by proposing Uganda¹⁸ for Jewish settlement. To this proposal Herzl replied that as far as the Jews

¹⁶Stevens, Zionism and Palestine. . . ., p. 13.

¹⁷Lowenthal, Op. cit., p. 375.

¹⁸The Zionists insisted that the Jews reside in Palestine. It was generally felt that Uganda would be too hot for white settlement. This matter continuously plagued Ugandan-Israeli relations in the 1960's when an East African visitor to Israel told Ben-Gurion that it was a good thing that the Jews did not implement their plans to settle in Uganda: "otherwise the Jews would have been kicked out now."

were concerned, the Zionist base 'must be in or near Palestine. Later on we could also settle in Uganda, for we have great masses of human beings ready to immigrate."¹⁹

Although Palestine was already inhabited by a large Arab population,²⁰ this fact held little significance to the Zionists. In fact, when Max Nordau, Herzl's second in command first received details on the existence of an Arab population in Palestine he came shocked to Herzl, exclaiming, "I never realized this, we are committing an injustice."²¹

At the beginning of the century when Zionists began to pour into Palestine, the fact that the country was already populated could no longer be ignored. The Jewish National Fund began purchasing land in 1905 and in 1908 the Palestine office was opened in Jaffa. Samuel Decalo gives an excellent example of the situation between Jews in the Holy Land and that of the Zionists immigrating to the area:

Prior to the arrival of the first wave of pioneers, the Jewish settlement in Palestine was composed of small, semi-detached, pious communities largely content with living an apolitical devout life in the Holy Land. Their pattern of life was rudely shattered by the arrival of ideological motivated (rather than religiously inspired) and action-oriented young settlers who, within a short span of time, transformed the social ethos of the land. Between 1882 and 1914 the Jewish population in Palestine grew from 34,000 to 85,000. After the First World War there were three more waves of migration, by 1939 an additional 310,000 settlers came to Palestine.²²

¹⁹Stevens, Op. cit., p. 383.

²⁰Although figures vary, it is estimated that shortly before the First World War, the Jewish population in Palestine was around 100,000; while the non-Jewish community consisted of 630,000 of whom 550,000 were Arab Palestinians.

²¹Cited in Bober, The Other Israel, p. 37

²²Samuel Decalo, "Israel and Africa: The Politics of Cooperation," p. 47.

During these years, the Jews began to gain a great upperhand over the ownership of the land and proclaimed that:

. . . the Jews, by race and origin an eastern people and by experience and skills a part of the west, were exceptionally qualified to bring the stagnant east into the orbit of western civilization. Zionism was introducing a dynamic impulse into Palestine which promised to infuse new life into the entire Near East.²³

Unlike other European settlers whose main interests were to enter the colonies and exploit the riches of the area along with the indigenous labor; the Zionists sought to create (through immigration) its own working class by replacing Arabs with Jews. The Zionists interest in the resources of the area was an equally important factor. Yet the prime motivation was to establish an exclusive Jewish state and Jewish control of the land mass; which in reality would be cloaked and sheltered by western nations.

In the United States, Zionists were receiving strong support from such leaders as Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis. Brandeis, himself a Jew and an outspoken Zionist wrote many articles about the need for America to support the aims of the Zionists. In his collection of essays entitled, Brandeis on Zionism, the Supreme Court Justice wrote of the need for every Jew to realize the goals of the Zionists. He also emphasized the impact that America was beginning to have on the Palestine question. In referring to the Jewish continued quest for Palestine he wrote:

What has been accomplished is due primarily to the great cause which we represent, and to the constant aid and support given us at home, and abroad by the officials of the United States government. Without the aid of the Navy Department; it would have been

²³Rufus Lears, Fulfillment: The Epic Story of Zionism. (Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1951), p. 172.

impossible to render the assistance which has preserved the Palestinian colonies and saved our brethren from distress.²⁴

While in America, the mantle of Zionist leadership fell upon Brandeis, in Britain it fell upon Dr. Chaim Weizman. For his part, Weizman had captured the hearts of the British. He had taught Chemistry at the University of Manchester; where his scientific attainments were to play an important part in the British war efforts. In fact, it was during the outbreak of war in November 1914 that Weizman was to take a very strong line toward British influence in Palestine. He wrote to the editor of the Manchester Guardian:

We can reasonably say that should Palestine fall within the British sphere of influence, and should Britain encourage a Jewish settlement there as a British dependency, we could have in twenty to thirty years a million Jews out there perhaps more; they would develop the country, bring back civilization to it and form a very effective guard for the Suez Canal.²⁵

This idea was pressed so hard that it culminated in the Balfour Declaration of 1917. This Declaration openly showed British approval of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine:

His Majesty's Government views with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.²⁶

It is important to note that the British government insisted upon

²⁴Louis D. Brandeis, Brandeis On Zionism (Washington: The Zionist Organization of America, 1942), p. 73.

²⁵Cited in Hyman Lumer, Zionism: Its Role in World Politics (New York: International Publishers, 1973), p. 33.

²⁶Cited in Stevens, Zionism and Palestine. . . ., p. 31.

a national home instead of a Jewish state.²⁷ Although the Declaration fell short of the wishes of Zionist militants; it was accepted and greeted by Jews as the preliminary to statehood. Thus, the battlecry for Zionists was to become one of "expulsion" of the Arabs for the settlement of Jews in Palestine.

After World War I, the Britians received a Mandate over Palestine. When the new administration in Britain was inaugurated in July of 1920, His Majesty, King George V sent the following message to the people of Palestine: "The Allied Powers whose armies were victorious in the last war have entrusted to my country a Mandate to watch over the interests of Palestine and to ensure to your country that peaceful and prosperous development which has so long been denied to you."²⁸

The Arab population in Palestine correctly interpreted the so called "peaceful and prosperous development" of their country as a scheme on the part of Zionists and British officials to secure Palestine for the Jews. In April 1920, anti-Jewish riots in Jerusalem and Jaffa, were read by the British as mere "disturbances". In the eyes of the Jews, such retaliations and the cry of "Palestine for the Palestinians" were interpreted as an age old quest to rid the world of the Jewish population.

With the advent of World War II, which resulted in the massacre of

²⁷ There is a difference. A national homeland would mean in fact, a place where the Jews could find refuge from oppression and could be received openly by other Jews and Arabs to live in peace and equality. The Jewish state meant an exclusive nation for "Jews only": whereby the rights and privileges of other nationals would be subordinated to the will of the Jews.

²⁸ Stevens, Op. cit., p. 42.

millions of Jews by Nazi Germany, the calls for an Israeli nation became louder. Although the British had allowed the Zionists to carry on campaigns in Palestine which resulted in such slogans as "Redeem the Land", "Jewish labor", and "Buy Jewish"; British officials became aware that they could no longer carry the burden of the Zionists for their Jewish state. Realizing that the oil fields, the pipelines and the Suez Canal might fall under German influence, the British produced a white paper which was aimed at gaining favor with the Arabs. It stated:

His Majesty's government now declares unequivocally that it is not a part of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish state. It should be a state in which the two people in Palestine, Arabs and Jews share authority in government in such a way that the essential interests of each are secured.²⁹

Taking these elements into consideration, the Zionists sought other avenues of support. They found, in the United States, an eager partner for their expansionist plans.

With the decline of British influence, a strong Zionist lobby was set up in Washington, and pro-American elements in World Zionism began to gain supremacy over the pro-British faction. The War had transformed the Jewish community in Palestine into a nation with its own economy, army, political organizations, language and ideology. The Zionist reorientation toward the United States, combined with growing American interests in the Middle East, only served to hasten British disapproval of this policy and resulted in an all-out Jewish-British confrontation. Britain, fearing the loss of British control over the area, was thrown into an armed conflict with the Jewish community in Palestine; whose main purpose

²⁹Cited in Bober, p. 44.

was to set up the Jewish nation.

In 1947, Britain, facing the disintegration of the empire, referred the Palestine problem to the United Nations. On November 27, 1947, the General Assembly adopted a resolution recommending the partition of Palestine. In May of 1948, the Zionist state was born.

Although this general overview has been extremely limited in scope, it attempted to give an idea of how the Zionist state came into being. The total role that imperialist powers, particularly the United States, played would take volumes to explain. In addition, basic factors such as American Jewish support for and role in the establishment of Israel, although not highlighted, were extremely important in the making of Israel. Suffice it to say, that the birth of the Zionist state would have been aborted had it not been for strong political and economic support from the major capitalist powers.

CHAPTER III

THE ISRAELI AID PROGRAMME: AN OVERVIEW

In his book, Technical Assistance: Theory, Practice and Policies, Maurice Domergue states that technical assistance (aid) can be defined as one of the means through which certain countries are trying to get closer to standards and ways of life prevailing in certain others. If this is the case in most African countries, the question to ask is after which country or countries would these nations like to pattern their development? The Israelis claim that if there is a model that African nations should follow in their development; it most definitely should be that of Israel's.

In order to not only gain friends in Africa and spread their own ideas as well, the Israeli government has built an aid-to-Africa programme that has broken down some political barriers and made the Israelis possibly the most welcomed strangers in Africa.¹ Proclaiming her political neutrality and her relative small size, Israel found herself in the early 1960's as a useful force in Africa. In fact one African leader is reported to have told an Israeli official, "you can barely manage to dominate yourself."² It is, therefore, under the guise of

¹The New York Times, October 16, 1970.

²Cited in Kreinin, p. 3.

complete political neutrality and non-alignment that Israel has managed to court black Africa. Offering, as it does, a different experience from western colonialism, Israel has placed itself along side African nations which are struggling against imperialism. This, in and of itself is paradoxical; because it has already been shown that Israel was established and held up by western imperialism. Consequently, Israel owes its allegiance to the West in general and to the United States in particular. Thus any actions taken by Israel to "help" the developing nations of Africa should be interpreted as an attempt to sway those nations toward the West. Therefore, the propaganda campaign that Israel is carrying on in Africa should, and to a large degree has been exposed for what it truly is; a new form of Western infiltration. Given the framework, articles written in Jewish journals which proclaim that Israel's policy toward Black Africa should perhaps be seen in wider terms, and should be recognized to be not just part of its defense line against the Arab world; but also of a genuine desire to be of help; should be scrutinized carefully.³

Needless to say, the Israelis have not restricted this type of analysis to Jewish journals. Consequently, one reads in western periodicals statements suggesting that the underdeveloped countries know that there is no danger of being swamped by Israel which carries neither the stigma of the colonialist powers nor the tentacles of the Soviet Union.⁴ There are those Zionist writers who admit the ties between Israeli aid and

³The Jerusalem Post Weekly, August 17, 1962. Cited in Kreinin, p. 7.

⁴"Search For Friends," The Economist, Vol. 191, May 16, 1959, p. 8.

Western imperialism. For example, Harvard Professor Nadav Safran notes that:

If there is any realistic motive in Israel's programme of foreign aid, it is probably to be found in the hope that it will draw tangible rewards from the United States by serving. . . the same objects that that country seeks to promote through its aid programme.⁵

Another aim of Israeli aid is to broaden its interests in Africa.

Sanford Silverburg comments:

Israeli foreign policy does enunciate a political purpose, namely that its aid and assistance--economic or military--is ultimately to serve its national interests. Israel is clearly attempting to broaden its presence as much as possible in every way that it is capable when it tenders military assistance to sub-Saharan Africa.⁶

The Financial Burden

In the beginning, the United States, Britain and other Western monopolies eyed Tel Aviv's flirtation with the developing countries with disapproval, regarding it as another rival. However, these powers soon became convinced that the Israeli government and its aid programme to Africa was a Godsend. Western states, particularly the United States, saw that by financing Israel's foreign aid programmes and using these as a cover, they could lay the blueprint for their own aggression and expansion in Africa. Simultaneously, the neo-colonialists began to lavish praise upon "tiny" Israel's effective and disinterested aid.⁷

⁵Nadav Safran The United States and Israel (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 267.

⁶Sanford Silverburg, "Israeli Military and Para Military Assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa: A Harbinger for the Role of the Military in Developing States." Master's thesis, American University, 1968, p. 8.

⁷Y. Kaskin, "Israeli Designs in Africa," International Affairs (Moscow), (February, 1972), 62.

Back in 1959, Arnold Rivkin⁸ gave the first ideological substantiation of the decision to use Israel for U. S. purposes. He concluded in his work on Africa and the West, that the Israeli type moderate socialism could become an important model for nations coming out against western domination and that the Israeli model could prove to be a sort of economic third force in Africa.

In 1964-1967, Israel received \$41.6 million out of the total U.S.A.'s official military aid of \$127 million for its military operations at home and abroad. In addition, the millions of dollars that the U. S. pours into Israel to sponsor its aid programme helps to secure the Israeli economy and stabilize the Zionist regime in the Middle East.

Although, a large amount of the U. S. aid is given to Israel for its overseas projects; only 0.05 percent of Israel's total foreign aid is used in Africa. Conversely, the Israelis have built an aid programme with Africa which has allowed the doors to be flung open to capitalist businessmen and to uphold pro-Western governments and to destroy progressive governments in Africa.

Framework of Programme

Israel has engaged in a programme of technical assistance with developing nations on a significant scale since 1961. Table 1 shows the listings of countries that have signed technical agreements with Israel and the year that these agreements were signed.

⁸The late Rivkin is author of Africa and the West and former director of the CIA-sponsored Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

TABLE 1

COUNTRIES WITH WHICH ISRAEL HAS SIGNED
COOPERATION AGREEMENTS
(as of 31 December 1971)

Bolivia	(1961)	Mali	(1969)
Brazil	(1962)	Mexico	(1966)
Burundi	(1962)	Nicaragua	(1963)
Cameroun	(1962)	Niger	(1963)
Central African Republic	(1962)	Panama	(1970)
Chile	(1965)	Peru	(1963)
Colombia	(1965)	Phillippines	(1964)
Costa Rica	(1965)	Romania	(1967)
Dahomey	(1961)	Ruanda	(1962)
Dominican Republic	(1963)	Sierra Leone	(1965)
El Salvador	(1971)	Tanzania	(1963)
Gabon	(1962)	Tchad	(1964)
Ghana	(1962)	Togo	(1964)
Guatemala	(1971)	Turkey	(1964)
Honduras	(1967)	Uganda	(1963)
Ivory Coast	(1962)	Upper Volta	(1961)
Kenya	(1966)	Uruguay	(1968)
Liberia	(1962)	Venezuela	(1966)
Malagasy Republic	(1961)	Zaire	(1971)
Malawi	(1968)		

Source: Israel's Programme of International Cooperation (Jerusalem: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1971), p. 66.

On a larger scale, the majority of Israeli experts have been concentrated on the Continent of Africa. Between 1958-71; the number of Israeli experts serving in Africa was almost triple that of those serving in Asia, Latin America and the Mediterranean area. The Israelis also have allowed more African students, personnel and trainees to enter their country than from other parts of the Third World.

Table 2 shows the number of total experts abroad in the year 1970. For this year alone, Israel was sending more experts to African nations than any other parts of the Third World.

The Israeli programme of assistance to Africa assumes several basic forms:

- (1) Highly trained Israeli experts are placed at the disposal of African states, often in strategically important positions.
- (2) Various categories of African personnel, including students, and servants, labor leaders and military cadre are given specialized training in Israel itself. This training is usually provided quickly and efficiently.
- (3) Israeli businessmen and their government have set up joint economic enterprises with African states and private business.⁹

On a larger scale, Israel aids in the technical fields of agriculture, regional and urban planning, youth training, vocational training, trade unionism and a host of other technical and para-military fields.

Of these areas, the youth training, referred to as Gadna (youth battalions) and Nachal (fighting pioneer youth) are extremely interesting. Theoretically, these programs are not political; in practice they create politically potent and military useful bodies. Here is what they do: Gadna, for boys and girls aged 14 to 18, offers sports, hiking, camping,

⁹Africa Research Group, "David and Goliath. . . .", p. 3.

TABLE 2

ISRAEL EXPERTS ABROAD IN 1970 (By Continent and Purpose)

	Agriculture	Youth Organization	Medicine and Health	Education	Construction and Building	Management and Public Service	Social Work and Community Development	Cooperation	Science and Technology	Miscellaneous	Number of Experts	Total man/months
Africa	53 (309)	74 (551½)	28 (159½)	17 (105½)	6 (31½)	28 (206½)	5 (16½)	3 (11½)	15 (78)	17 (25½)	246	1495
Asia	29 (187½)	1 (3)	1 (1)	—	2 (9)	9 (25½)	1 (6)	4 (5½)	3 (10½)	13 (20)	63	268
Latin America and the Carib- bean	42 (311½)	11 (57½)	—	3 (5)	2 (3½)	23 (110½)	—	1 (12)	3 (2)	10 (46)	95	548
Mediterranean Area and Others	10 (36½)	—	2 (1)	6 (3)	1 (1½)	2 (2)	—	—	1 (1)	3 (5)	25	50
Total	134 (844½)	86 (612)	31 (161½)	26 (113½)	11 (45½)	62 (344½)	6 (22½)	8 (29)	22 (91½)	43 (96½)	429	2361

Figures in brackets show man/months

Source: Israel's Programme of International Cooperation (Jerusalem: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1971), p. 58.

crafts, group discussions and cultural activities, as well as physical work and some pre-military training. Nachal, which takes up where Gadna leaves off, is for young men and women of military age and includes paratroop or regular military training, followed by agricultural settlement in difficult or dangerous places.¹⁰

The Israelis have also sought to impose their pseudo-socialist Kibbutz and Moshav farm systems on black Africa as a general alternative. Israel's agricultural programmes are arranged around and usually organized by the military. Before he became Defense Minister, Moshe Dayan was Minister of Agriculture. The entire Kibbutz and Moshav system reflect the militarization of agriculture in Israel.

It is exactly these type co-operatives that the Israeli government exports to Africa. This position is also supported by Western writers. Peter Worsley serves as an excellent example of how the majority of Western writers portray Israel. On the subject of agriculture, Worsley contends:

African independent peasants working on their own patches within the context of traditional community culture thus find the Israeli Moshav a more relevant model than more strictly collectivist forms of organization such as the Soviet Kolkhoz or the Cuban state farms.

Israel insures the tight control that she has over her aid programme by keeping in close touch with those nations which she has technical and military ties. The graduates of Israel's training courses are bound together into an international association which is headed by Israelis.¹²

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 5.

¹¹ Peter Worsley, The Third World; Found in Africa Research Group, "David and Goliath. . . .", p. 6.

¹² Ironically, the name of this organization is "Shalom" which in Hebrew means peace.

The members of this organization keep in close touch with each other by various reunions, conferences and celebrations. Through such meetings the entire scope of Israeli life is again pressed upon these trainees and graduates. In order to create and maintain a favorable image, the Israeli technical experts carry with them a pro-Israeli government line.

Technical Aid

In most works about Israeli aid programmes to Africa by Zionist scholars, Israeli aid is usually referred to as "technical co-operation." According to Domergue, there should be a distinction here between the terms "technical assistance" and "technical co-operation". Domergue indicates that technical assistance means one person gives and the other receives. The first know (or knows how to do) something which the other does not. On the other hand, technical co-operation implies that both parties start on the same footing each of them shares their know how with the other.¹³ It could be suggested that the Zionists use the term co-operation instead of aid or assistance because of the attraction that goes along with the word.

It is clear, for instance, that a nation which "gives" technical assistance to another country may well have some avowed or concealed interests in the deal as one of its goals. The goal may be political or cultural influence, strategic or diplomatic considerations, long-term commercial aims, and so forth.¹⁴

The above evidence supports the conclusion that Israel's programme in Africa is more of a technical assistance programme than one of technical co-operation. In the words of an Israeli official:

¹³Maurice Domergue, Technical Assistance: Theory, Practice and Policies (New York: Praeger, 1973), p. 15.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 17.

In our relations with other countries we always found ourselves asking for something: loans from the industrial nations, military assistance from France a mutual security pact and friendship treaties with Western countries and release of Jews from Russia. We have not yet been asked to give anything in return. True, we once gave the Bible to the world—but this was a long time ago with Africa we have an opportunity to restore some balance to our international relations.¹⁵

Historically, we can trace the first instance of a "purely" Israeli programme of technical assistance back to the mid-fifties, when political contacts with Burma were being strengthened. Several teams of experts were dispatched to that country and Burmese servicemen were received in Israel for training in agricultural pioneering methods. Contacts multiplied and the Israeli technical assistance programme was born.

From the very beginning, the co-ordinating agency for Israel's technical aid programme was the International Cooperation Division of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Jerusalem. Since 1958, this division has set up aid programmes with more than 80 countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. As of 1971, nearly 4,000 Israeli advisors had served in developing countries in assignments linked with training of local personnel, and nearly 15,000 men and women from developing countries have acquired in Israel skills and know-how to be taken back to their country.

Conversely, it is not surprising that since Israel's designs on Africa seem to aid in the continuation of neo-colonial and repressive regimes which are focused on one or another imperialist power; the Israelis focus a substantial amount of their aid on racial oppressive regimes in Africa. Thus, of the 38 countries in Africa receiving aid, Israel has included the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mozambique and the South

¹⁵Krein, pp. 11-12.

African controlled South West Africa. Moreover, Israel gives assistance to the racist government of Rhodesia and has extremely extensive aid programmes with Malawi, Swaziland, Lesotho and Botswana; nations which are independent but are controlled economically by the Republic of South Africa.

Between 1951 and 1962, Israel received \$15 million in aid and assistance from the United States. The Africa Research Group noted that the transfer of funds to Israel from the United States was done to set up networks of communication between Israel and the developing world. The thrust of this aid programme being: U. S. expertise was imported into other countries. It is interesting to note that the Israelis did not footnote the American aid programme per se; but modified it with a distinctiveness based on Israeli experience.¹⁶

While on the one hand, the United States openly declares that aid is an instrument of U. S. Foreign policy, on the other, she proclaims that this aid is meant to bring about a feeling of "self help" toward the recipient country. Hence, while the Israelis claim that their aid is non-political; the purpose of U. S. aid is not as forthright.

The purpose of U. S. foreign aid is to promote development. But development, is not an end in itself: it is a means to the establishment and maintenance of free democratic peaceful societies. Political security and economic stability are seen as the results of development aid.¹⁷

¹⁶ But unlike the United States, Israel never established self contained assistance missions abroad. Nor did Israel set up commissaries or acquire bloc houses for Israelis. The main thrust of the Israeli aid structure was to work alongside the nations of the other countries and to live on the sites of projects.

¹⁷ Paul Stretsen, Aid to Africa: A Policy Outline for the 1970's (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), p. 27.

Yet, Israel has not denied that some of the basic reasons for her aid to Africa is to foster her own self interests, such as the obvious advantages of gaining friends in the African world. In addition, Israel seeks to pave the way for an expansion of export markets for her products. Further, the Israelis realize that technical aid with other nations can provide employment for a small but significant Israeli manpower surplus.

Although Israel's technical assistance programme was the most extensive one in the world (on a per capita basis) its overall drain upon Israel's manpower is proportionally small. This is particularly due to the African cadres undergoing training in Israel. Moreover, Israel's technical assistance programme utilizes many technicians, professionals, and doctors who normally would have been functionally unemployed at home.¹⁸ Consequently, the Israeli government has allowed Jewish entrepreneurs to invest in Africa on a much higher scale than in other developing areas. Once the gates to African nations are opened by setting up aid programmes, then the framework is set for Zionist businessmen to come in and exploit the riches of Africa.

Emphasizing that after 1966, Israeli aid began to decrease in favor of Israeli trade. Stuart Schaar has cited another reason for Israeli interest in Africa:

After ten years of African experience, Israel has begun to re-think both the philosophy and aims of her trade ventures below the Sahara. Initially, Israelis have argued, assistance to Africa began as a relatively disinterested activity. . . whatever underlying motives may have been over a decade ago in founding networks of international co-operation, it quickly became clear that the key to Israel's relations with Africa was the desire to woo as many states as possible away from the

¹⁸Decalo, "Israel and Africa" The Politics of Co-operation. . . .", p. 142.

Egyptian orbit of influence. (However recently) the potential of African markets for absorbing surplus farm commodities and manufactured products attracted Jewish entrepreneurs to the sprawling continent as soon as they had goods to sell abroad; and accordingly, exports to Africa increased from 2 million in 1956 to 24.4 million in 1967 represents only 4 per cent of Israel's total exports, it is still 20 per cent higher than the corresponding figure for 1966 (\$19.5 million). These statistics, when matched against others relating to African technical assistance, provide some indication of the greater emphasis which Israel has lately been placing on trade rather than aid in Africa.¹⁹

Technical assistance is not the only aid programme which Israel exports to African nations. As early as 1962, Israel was involved in one of the most extensive aid programmes ever to be dispensed to African nations: military assistance.

Military Assistance

Of all the areas in which Israel has advised, sent trainees and invested money with developing nations; perhaps the most notorious is its military assistance programme. In Africa alone, between 1960 and 1966 Israel had set up military aid programmes with nearly every black African nation. Here is a brief example of what Israel did as regards military aid to Africa. In 1963, 243 Congolese paratroopers were sent to Israel for air training; this list included President, General Joseph Mobutu. In 1960 Israel organized the Ghana Air Force and helped to implement its flying school. In 1963, 15 Ugandan army officers were trained in Israel and by 1964 Israel had trained the entire Uganda Air Force.

Table 3 gives a listing of African nations and the nature of the military training dispensed to them by Israel. According to Silverburg,

¹⁹Stuart H. Schaar, "Patterns of Israeli Aid and Trade in East Africa," American Universities Field Staff Reports: East Africa Series, (May, 1972), Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 1-2.

Israel's motives for tendering military aid to Africa are grounded in that nation's long range political goals. Silverburg explains:

Israeli objectives are by far, long range political goals that by their very nature have had effects on the internal development of institutions within several sub-Saharan states. In this instance the institution is the military establishment. A third contributing factor to the complexity of Israeli motivation in Africa is the priority by which aid is given to meet state's ends. Israeli military assistance to Ethiopia, is, in part due to the latter's contiguity to the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab. This, therefore, is an attempt to protect its shipping lanes to the Afro-Asian commercial world and from there to Israel. While this is the case in Ethiopia it is a political motive in the Congo(K). This political priority is manifested in the training of paratroops. This training is intended to (1) maintain the viability of the state which will in turn provide (2) a political ally in Africa.²⁰

TABLE 3

ISRAELI MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ASSISTANCE
PROGRAMS TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
1960-66

Country	Year	Nature of Israeli Program
Cameroon	1966	Israeli Army officers set up Nahal-Gadna system in January.
Central African Republic	1960	50 study grants to individuals.
	1962	14 Army officers set up National Pioneer Youth with Israel-trained staff (2-year contract).
Chad	1964	Student training by advisers sent to youth movement.
	1967	2 Israeli advisers killed in counter-insurgency operations with Chad Army against National Liberation Front of Chad.

²⁰Silverburg, Op. cit., pp. 8-9.

TABLE 3—Continued

Country	Year	Nature of Israeli Program
Congo (K)	1963	243 Congolese paratroops sent to Israel for air training, including now President, General Joseph Mobutu.
	1964	Israeli advisers go to Congo to provide 100 more Congolese troops with parachute instruction, in October.
	1968	In March, Israelis train 35 more paratroopers in First Paracommando Battalion, considered "best unit".
Dahomey	1962	Israelis "advise" First Army Pioneer Company
	1966	2 Israeli advisers administer Young Pioneers Youth Movement (USAID supported)
Ethiopia	1960-66	Israelis operate counterinsurgency program directed against Eritrean Liberation Front and Shiftas of Kenya.
		Israelis replace US Special Forces "removed" after aborted coup by US-trained Ethiopian officers.
		Substantial cooperation between Ethiopian and Israeli military operations includes: training for special forces, intelligence, counterinsurgency operations.
		Israel maintains major military mission graduating 500 men every 6 months.
Ghana		Israel cooperates with US and Ethiopian military in establishing base at Jebel Hamid.
		Ghana Air force and flying school organized, jeopardizing Britain's unilateral control.

TABLE 3--Continued

Country	Year	Nature of Israeli Program
		Israel provides assistance to Army, Navy units.
		British commercial interests force Israel out of Ghana
Ivory Coast	1961	Nahal-Gadna type program set up with help from USAID.
		Service civique revamped and revitalized, to consternation of French.
	1963	Army school for "civic action" established.
		On advice of Israel, Ivory Coast seeks to use Army in "national service".
		Israel equips Presidential Guard with Israeli-made Uzzi 7:66mm submachine guns.
Kenya	1963	5 Air Force cadets and 30 Army personnel "unofficially" trained through 1963 (negligible program).
Malawi		Israel trains medical personnel. 4 instructors help set up Malawi Young Pioneers Movement, paramilitary organization of 500 to 700 members.
Nigeria	1967	Army and police training provided. Israeli-made 11 mm mortars supplied.
		1967 charge that Israel also supplies weapons to Biafra denied by Israeli ambassador to Nigeria in January 1969.
Sierra Leone	1966	Israel helps set up Military Academy; 65 officers remain for 2 additional years.
Tanzania	1963	50 cadets trained in 193-day course.
		National Service Corps set up on Israeli model with Israeli assistance runs into trouble when 117 members are detrained or discharged for disloyalty

TABLE 3—Continued

Country	Year	Nature of Israeli Program
		(no implication of Israeli involvement).
	1964	24 Naval Marine cadets trained.
	1966	120 police receive paratroop training; unit assigned to maintain order, deter cattle rustling and, according to speculations, reserved for use against Zanzibar if necessary.
		Israel rumored to be involved with Tanzanian intelligence.
Togo	1961	7-man Israeli team organizes Agricultural Youth Corps using Gadna techniques.
		Experiments with moshav settlement schemes initiated.
Uganda	1963	15 Army officers, 5 pilots trained in Israel.
	1964	Air force organized and trained.
	1966	Israel assumes all military training, supplies some planes, is alleged to be conduit for French assistance to Uganda.

Source: Africa Research Group, "David and Goliath Collaborate in Africa," pp. 9-13.

As far as capabilities are concerned, the Israeli military programme is extremely flexible and independent. According to Silverburg, although strict military assistance conducted on the part of the Israeli Ministry of Defense with the possible coordination of the other ministries, the military need not seek approval from the Knesset for its aid programmes as long as it has allocated funds for its overseas activities. The allo-

cation of funds for such programmes has not been a tremendous problem to the Israelis in as much as the United States finances the bulk of the Israeli aid programme.

Politically, the Israelis do more than just "train" army personnel in African states. The entire programme is a conscious effort to align African nations with the West. For example, in the case of Ethiopia, the Israelis operated counterinsurgency programmes which were directed against the Eritrean Liberation Front. Afraid that this nationalist movement would undermine his pro-West leadership in that nation, Emperor Haile Selassie asked for and received military aid from Israel. The Eritrean Front had always been an unpopular movement with the United States and it was the aim and ambition of the United States government to keep Emperor Selassie in power; although his rule has continued to be at best, autocratic and dictatorial.

Another instance of Israeli aggression in Africa is its support of the separatist Biafran in Nigeria.

Up to July 1969, Israel had sent 250,000 of official aid for Biafran relief and dispatched several medical teams. Foreign Minister Abba Eban, speaking in the Israeli Parliament, stated on July 9 that the Israeli government had "the duty" to send maximum aid to Biafra. A broadcast on Radio Kaduna (Northern Nigeria) later that month accused Israel of sending tanks, artillery and rockets to Biafra in the guise of relief supplies and of training Biafrans in guerrilla warfare techniques.²¹

Consequently, Israel's military assistance does have a political function. It seeks to continue repressive regimes in Africa and to foster a Western oriented ideology on the military in Africa.

²¹"Israel and Biafra: A Comparison," Midstream, January, 1970. Cited in Hyman Lumer, Zionism: Its Role in World Politics (New York: International Publishers, 1973), p. 47.

CHAPTER IV

GHANA AND ISRAEL: 1957-1964

Since its birth, Israel has sought to have close ties with African nations. The mere fact that Liberia voted for the partition of Palestine, was in and of itself a blessing for the Israelis. During the early fifties there was an honorary Israeli consulate set up in Monrovia, although diplomatic missions between these two countries were not exchanged until 1957.¹

However, it was the effect of Israel's co-operation and ties with Ghana that were to radiate all over the African continent. Therefore, after gaining its independence in March of 1957, Ghana was to be faced with a new force in Africa. Masquerading under the guise of mutual co-operation and neutrality, Israel was to become an important factor in Ghanaian politics. Ghana, for its part, was to shake the foundations of the African continent by instituting a long range trade and aid programme with Israel. Need we hasten to add, the very nature of this relationship would lean heavily toward new found advances for Israel in Africa; while it would also serve to undermine the general goal of African Nationalism, the eradication and dismissal of western economic and political power on the continent.

¹ Liberia delighted Israeli diplomats by transferring its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in May of 1969. A move which even the United States and Great Britain refused to make because there is no international agreement on the status of the Holy City.

March 6, 1957 was independence day for Ghana. Fifty-six nations sent delegations. The United States was represented by Richard Nixon, Britain by R. A. Butler, Russia by its Minister of Farms and Tunisia by Bourguiba himself. Israel sent Ehud Avriel, the man who was later to be a most important person in Ghana's domestic and foreign policy.

From the vantage point of the West, Ghana at first appeared safe. That is, the United States and Great Britain had viewed the transformation from colonialism to independence in Ghana as the "correct" procedure or model for other nations to follow. The Americans along with the British presented their credentials to the new nation first. They were soon followed by the representatives from Australia, France and West Germany. Yet, from the beginning, the Israeli ambassador had established himself as the most influential, diplomat in Accra.

In order to understand the very strong ties which Israel had with Ghana, it is extremely important to note the political philosophy and personality of Ghana's first President.

Kwame Nkrumah

During the early stages of Ghana's fight with British colonialism, the outspoken leader of the African position was Kwame Nkrumah. Nkrumah organized the Convention People's Party in June 1949 and through this organization he fought for the freedom of Ghana from colonial rule.

When Ghana became independent within the Commonwealth of Nations in 1957, Nkrumah became bent on curtailing foreign domination in the newly independent country. He therefore sought aid and assistance from both Western and Eastern nations as he proclaimed the political neutrality of Ghana.

Internationally, Nkrumah was thought of as the leader of African

independence and nationalism. In those very early days of Africa's struggle against colonialism, Nkrumah was a raging voice in support of strong African unity against the colonial oppressors. In his book, Africa Must Unite, Nkrumah stated:

A point in our history has been reached where Africa's interests must be the prime concern of Africa's leaders. The safety and progress of everyone of our states can be safeguarded only by the acceptance of the precept; which can best be promoted by unalloyed unity. This means that where associations linking African countries with European powers cut across basic African interests at any level and offer impediments to the goal of union, they must be discarded and rejected where they are offered. In all relations with the world overseas, the key consideration must be not merely the superficial or even intrinsic advantage of such relationships for the given country but the obligation to the African continent as a whole.²

Even though Africa Must Unite, was published after the demise of Nkrumah, his earlier writings foretold his genuine and sincere belief in African freedom and dignity. While more moderate leaders in Ghana were calling for eventual independence, Nkrumah urged the Ghanaians to seek "self government now". His staunch position on this matter and popular support from the African population raised him to an even higher level in the struggle for African determination, solidarity and independence.

In his work, I Speak of Freedom, Nkrumah spoke the words that would make Ghana the very first Black African nation to break the chains of colonial rule and direct foreign oppression. Asserting the basic need for independence, Nkrumah notes that there comes a time in the history of colonial peoples when they must because of their will to throw off the hampering shackles of colonialism, boldly assert their God-given right to

²Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite (New York: International Publishers, 1970), p. 185.

be free of foreign rule.³

In light of what has been written about Nkrumah's general ideology, it seems almost paradoxical that the Israelis would have gained such a large foothold in Ghana during his Presidency. Zionists assert that the close ties between Israel and Ghana were sown because of Nkrumah's wish to counter potential Egyptian influence in Black Africa.⁴

Another reason for Nkrumah's general attitude towards Israel was his basic educational background and political outlook. He had gone to school in the United States and Great Britain. He took pride in these factors and in the general principles of Western democracy and free speech. In his address to the House of Commons and Senate in Ottawa in July of 1957 Nkrumah proclaimed:

We in Ghana have a strong feeling of pride in our Commonwealth. . . . On obtaining our independence, we choose to become a member of the Commonwealth of our own free will. We enjoy the same institutions of parliamentary democracy and the same climate of politics and public morality as the other members; we have the same respect for tradition and the same regard for ceremonial; we place the same value on the human individual and appreciate the dignity of restraint; we accept the sovereignty of Law and the sanctity of the pledged word.⁵

Therefore, Nkrumah's overall respect and admiration for Western institutions and parliamentary procedure should not be underestimated vis-a-vis his general attitude toward foreign policy goals for Ghana.

Taking his admiration for western institutions a bit further, Nkrumah delighted American newsmen at a United States press conference in 1957.

³Kwame Nkrumah, I Speak of Freedom (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), pp. 30-31.

⁴See for example, Arnold Rivkin "Israel and the Afro-Asian World," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 37, No. 3 (April, 1959), 486-87.

⁵Nkrumah, I Speak of Freedom, p. 136.

On the general question of racism in the United States, Nkrumah remarked that wherever racism existed it should be abolished. However, he hastened to add: "It seems, however, that the racial question in the United States had often been exaggerated deliberately by those who hope to bring the country into disrepute". All this, from a man who had spent years in America and who had himself experienced the hideous nature of American racism. On the question of a communist element in Ghana, he replied: "So far as I know, I don't think there is any communist element or group as such We in Ghana have no fear. I might even go further and say that our better institutions. . . do not allow the ideology to have a fruitful set-up in our country." And finally, on the matter of his close ties with Israel and possible objections from African states, Nkrumah said: "There is not, and there can never be any objections from any other African government. . . , I remember when I was in Cairo I was never even asked the question."⁶

More importantly, Nkrumah's ties with Israel were to allow the Israeli aid programme to spread over the African continent. Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Hasting Banda of Malawi, and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia along with a host of other African leaders raced to set up diplomatic ties with the Zionist state. Through Nkrumah, Israel achieved a great diplomatic coup throughout Africa.

In summary, Nkrumah's attitude toward Israel was far from negative. Of course, he considered the country as an imperialist enclave; but certainly not an illegally established one like Rhodesia. He admired what the Israelis had accomplished. "Remember too that in those years his first

⁶Ibid., pp. 139-40.

priority was to develop Ghana, and he thought we could do much to help him",⁷ an Israeli diplomat noted.

Aid and Trade

Early in 1957, the Israeli Minister of Commerce and Industry went to Ghana to represent Israel at the independence day ceremony. Formal trade relations between the countries were cemented shortly thereafter. The initial contact, however, between these two nations took place in 1956 when the Israeli representative to the 1956 inauguration of the Liberian President met Ghana's Minister of Labor (Mr. Botsio), the latter asked that an Israeli consulate be set up in Accra. The very first Israeli in a Black African country was to be H. Yavor; he was later followed by Ehud Avriel, who was to play a dynamic role in the establishment of trade and aid agreements between the two countries.

The first shipment of Israeli goods to Ghana consisted of 1,000 tons of cement and miscellaneous industrial items. In 1958 a long term trade agreement between Israel and Ghana was made. The principal feature of this agreement was the provision of credits to Ghana in the sum of \$20 million over a four year period. All credits involved in a two year grace period for payments of principal. Under the agreement, Ghana bought cement and other building material and equipment, tires, glass, ceramics, paper, cardboards, leather goods, plastics and other industrial goods. In return, Ghana exported to Israel, cocoa, coffee, copra, oil seeds, hides, bauxite and diamonds.⁸

Although the terms of this agreement appeared favorable to Ghana,

⁷Thompson, Op. cit., p. 47.

⁸Rivkin, "Israel and the Afro-Asian World," p. 489.

in actuality, this agreement and similar ones like it which were enacted all over Africa, were extremely beneficial to the Israeli government. Samuel Decalo explains that African imports of a number of Israeli commodities (e.g., furniture, cement, distilled soya oil), even if small in absolute figures amount to over 50 percent of total Israeli exports of these items. He also adds that there are a number of other commodities (e.g., asbestos, pipes, pharmaceuticals, carpets) of which Africa purchases 25 percent of the Israeli exports with significant purchases of others below the figure.⁹

A company was formed in 1957 by Israel and Ghana to coordinate trade between Israel and West Africa. As the headquarters for Dizengoff West Africa Ltd., Accra became the center of trade between Israel and all of West Africa. The purpose of this company was to allow Israeli business firms to trade with West African nations without the use of Western business firms in the transactions. With a branch office in Tel Aviv, the Israelis soon opened another branch of the company in Lagos, Nigeria in the early months of 1958. It is not surprising that the company received orders for over 550,000 dollars worth of Israeli goods; while Ghana and the rest of West Africa exported only half that amount.

By far, the most ambitious undertaking between Israel and Ghana was the Black Star Shipping Line which was incorporated in Ghana in the fall of 1957. In the beginning, Ghana owned 60 percent of the corporation with Israel receiving the remaining 40 percent. However, within a five year period Ghana had the option to buy out the remaining 40 percent from the Israelis.

⁹Decalo, "Israel and Africa; A Selected Bibliography," p. 391.

A strange situation occurred after the dedication of the Black Star Line in Ghana. Nkrumah, either from sheer caution or because of strong resentment that was building up against him in Egypt, did not thank the Israelis for the project. Although he did express gratitude the next day in Parliament after Avriel had pointed out his omission.¹⁰

The 40 percent that Israel owned in the Black Star Line belonged to Zim (the Israeli Navigation Company), which was a private Israeli corporation. Needless to say, Zim was the managing agent and opted to operating the Black Star Line for five years. According to Israeli sources, Nkrumah asked them to manage the Line for twenty-five years. (While Israel appearing not to be ambitious) openly compromised for five. According to Silverburg, this was an indication that:

Israel is setting out to demonstrate in West Africa how she can launch a foreign assistance programme on a shoestring. . . The effort is plainly intended to build friendship with the independent African countries as a counter-force to the influence of the Arab bloc, as well as to develop trade relations.¹¹

After the shipping line was formed, Israel then followed up with an offer to Ghana to train 30 of its citizens to become ship officers at the Israeli Maritime School at Accra.

Another venture the Israelis undertook in Ghana was investment in the building industry. As in the case of the Black Star Line, Israel owned 40 percent, which was controlled by Solel Boneh. The Ghanaians received

¹⁰ It is even stranger to cite the fact that in spite of the numerous invitations bestowed upon him by Zionists, Nkrumah never visited Israel. Conversely, he visited Cairo on several occasions and even expressed solidarity with Egypt on the Middle East conflict. Although he did not brand Israel as an imperialist aggressor until the early '60's.

¹¹ Silverburg, Op. cit., p. 42.

60 percent of the industry. The industrial complex of Israel's General Federation of Trade Union (Histadrut) and Solel Boneh, trained Ghanaians in the techniques of the construction industry.

During this period, Ghana moved to change its trade union movement so that it could be closely aligned to that of Israel's. At the end of the 1950's the leaders of Ghana's government had come to believe that their trade union structure was "different in structure and in aims from the labor movement in Western industrial countries, similar to the Histadrut in aims but in structure a Ghanaian movement as such."¹² This movement and the total role that Israel played in Ghana remained strong up until 1963, the year that Nkrumah began to alter his policies toward Israel.

In October of 1960, the Histadrut organized the Afro-Asian Institute for Labor Studies and Cooperation in Tel Aviv. This organization was headed by Ellahu Elath, Israel's first Ambassador to the United States. Financed by a grant through the AFL-CIO, the Institute was organized and funded at the cost of \$60,000. Between 1960-62 alone, it received over \$300,000 in scholarships and grants from the American organization. The Africa Research Group points out that African trade unions are highly political instruments and that the training which takes place in Israel seeks to depolitize them by pushing a cooperative orientation rather than a working class revolutionary one.

Military Assistance

The Israelis were instrumental in the organization and formation of

¹²Ghana's TUC. The New Charter for Ghana's Labor (Accra). Quoted in Kreinin, p. 123.

the Ghana Air Force. Claiming that their mission was to provide training and instruction in the various types of aircrafts, the Israelis sought to counter any other foreign military training in Ghana. To be precise, the formal and actual mission of setting up an air force was initially given to India. However, the Israelis, acting under the control of Avriel, raced to become the military trainers in this West African nation.

But due to the insistence of Nkrumah that the complicated affairs could bring on internal problems, the Israelis along with the Indians were advised to leave Ghana and hand the training of the air force over to the British. General Henry J. Alexander, Nkrumah's former chief of staff explains the situation this way:

During 1959, two Indian Air Force officers had arrived to start planning the formation of the Ghana Air Force, and it was intended that the Indians should train it. Unfortunately, for reasons best known to the Ghana government, the establishment of a flying school was entrusted to the Israelis. This Israeli training team took the form of a mission responsible to the Israeli ambassador and not under effective command of the Indians. . . As very little progress had been made with the actual ordering of air craft and the formation of the Air Force as such, I decided that the whole problem needed to be assessed. The first principle which I established with Nkrumah was that one country and one country only should be responsible for training. To my mind, it could have been either the Indians or the Israelis complete. Nkrumah would not accept a solution of this kind, since he did not wish to offend one country whilst appearing to favour the other. I therefore, suggested that he ask the British to take on the air force (and) ask both the Israelis and the Indians to step down.¹³

The result of the decision brought on sharp criticism by the Israelis. For their part, the Israelis insisted that British commercial interests were involved. Rationalizing that because Israel was using French planes,

¹³ [Major General] H. T. Alexander, African Tightrope: My Two Years as Nkrumah's Chief of Staff (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965), pp. 14-15.

the Zionists insisted that this was a decision by the British to curtail French control in Ghana. "It was believed that the British were concerned lest Israeli training might result in a decision by Ghana to bring in French instead of British jet aircraft."¹⁴ To be sure, the Israelis were not as concerned about the British commercial interests as they were about losing their strong political position in Ghana.

In 1960, Ghana requested the Israeli Defense Ministry to furnish officer instructors to help the new Ghanaian Army. Five Israeli officers were sent to serve as instructors for Ghana's infantry officers and four were sent to the Ghana Builders Brigade (an organization similar to the Israeli Nachal). Two senior Israeli officers, Lieutenant Colonel Y. Bin-Dor and Lieutenant Colonel Y. Dvier were chosen by Nkrumah to help with the Navy. Bin-Dor headed the Nautical School, while Dvier commanded Nkrumah's personal yacht. The chief engineer of the yacht was also an Israeli.

In the final analysis, however, Israel's achievements in Ghana was the result of one man's diplomacy. In Nkrumah's nine years, only two ambassadors were outstanding favorites on the diplomatic scene in Accra, and had considerable influence over him. One of them was George Rodionov (between 1962-66), the Russian ambassador to Ghana; the other was Ehud Avriel (between 1957-1960), of Israel.

As Ambassador to Ghana, Avriel filled the role of confidant to Nkrumah. In fact, Avriel, was the man who introduced Nkrumah to Lumumba.

But, according to Scott Thompson, in diplomatic circles this was considered less remarkable than that at times it was Avriel

¹⁴Silverburg, Op. cit., p. 63.

who had to intercede to arrange an appointment for the American Ambassador with Nkrumah. When Nkrumah wished to write a book, it was Avriel who produced the Ghost, who in turn quickly produced a serviceable manuscript. True, Avriel was the beneficiary of weak American and British diplomacy, but his competence and foresight stand out no less for this.¹⁵

For over a year, Avriel had a clear field but, apparently sensing that at some point Nkrumah's pan-African ambitions and Israel's diplomatic aims would collide, he was skeptical of the relationship from the start. Unlike the Americans and the British, he made the most of his opportunity, obtaining the substance of what Israel wanted—its entry into Africa. As early as 1959, he began scaling the conspicuous activity down so as to make their long-range position more tenable. When Nkrumah's ideas for the Black Star Line became extravagant by Israelis standards, the Israelis opted out, before Egyptian pressure might have driven them out. After all, the ships were blacklisted from Suez and it was a delicate situation which neither Egypt's Nasser nor Nkrumah wished to put to the test.

In the meantime, relations with Egypt had grown apace. Nkrumah's two fold policy would indeed have to change if he were to appear as a friend to the Egyptians. After all, Egypt was in Africa and strong Ghanaian-Israeli relations would only foster strained relations between Ghana and Egypt in particular and Ghana and in the Arab world in general.

Egypt and Ghana

At the 1961 Casablanca Conference, where the more moderate African states were not represented, Egypt's President Nasser made of his sharpest

¹⁵Thompson, p. 48.

attacks on the Israeli role in Africa:

Israel is at present granting aid in Africa, even though we know that Israel is not in a position to balance her budget from her resources. That is because this country is acting as a go-between between the colonial powers and the countries of Africa passing on aid to them. Israel is the wolf which has gotten into the sheepfold. What was Israel's attitude with regards to the Cameroons and the Congo? What was her attitude with regard to the Algerian people? What was her attitude in regard to nuclear tests in the Sahara?¹⁶

The Casablanca Conference was not the first occasion upon which the United Arab Republic (UAR) sought to ostracize Israel. Indeed, efforts in this direction were made at the very first African meeting convoked-- the 1958, Accra First Conference of Independent African States. However, the charges against Israel came to no avail at this conference, largely due to Nkrumah's unwillingness to brand Israel as a neo-colonialist power. The 1960, Second Conference of Independent African States (IAS) (Addis Ababa) saw another attempt by Nasser to ostracize Israel. This too was unsuccessful, and many African states refused to even connect themselves politically with the Arab cause in the Middle East, not to mention the rights of the Palestinian people.

The year 1961, was however, Nasser's year. On January 7th, a communique entitled the Casablanca Communique, was issued. Included in the communique was a resolution on Palestine in which the signatories (Ghana, Guinea and Mali), denounced Israel as an instrument in the service of imperialism and neo-colonialism not only in the Middle East, but also in Africa and Asia.

Although Israel was first to set up diplomatic ties with Ghana, ties

¹⁶Doudore Theam, The Foreign Policy of African States (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 66.

of friendship between Egypt and Ghana had been sown as early as 1957. The fact that Nkrumah married an Egyptian Coptic woman in December, 1957 was one of the most bizarre alliances made of rational foreign policy in Ghanaian history. In choosing his wife, Nkrumah dispatched a member of Parliament, William Baidoe-Ansah, an alert and intelligent businessman off to Egypt to find him a bride. Baidoe-Ansah consulted five Coptic families and finally made a deal with Mr. Adley Marcos Sadek for the hand of his niece Fathia Halem Ritzk, a student at Cairo University. She was flown to Ghana on December 30th and was married to Nkrumah three hours later.¹⁷ The Egyptian wife of Nkrumah did not speak one word of English nor he any Arabic. In spite of the language barrier, Nkrumah and his wife remained together and that union became a catalyst for stronger Egyptian-Ghanaian ties.

The Grand Cordon of the Order of the Nile, Egypt's highest decoration served as a wedding present to the couple. Ironically, the Ghanaian government signed a twenty million dollar trade deal with Israel on the very same day that this decoration was received. Lebanon followed in due course and sent its highest decoration, the Order of the Cedars. With the stage thus set, Nkrumah was in a starring role to court Arab powers.

Dr. M. Fawzi, the Egyptian Foreign Minister held Nkrumah in high esteem. At the IAS Conference he discussed the possibility of military cooperation between Egypt and Ghana. This included a joint African high command. Although the proposal went no further for at least two years,

¹⁷ Russell Warren Howe, "Ghana: The First Year," Phylon, Vol. 19, No. 3, (1958), p. 285.

it showed the interests and foresight that both shared toward African affairs.

In mid-1958 the Egyptian ambassador arrived in Accra. From the outset one of the driving forces behind the Egyptian policy was to force the Israelis out. Avriel, was determined, however, on keeping the Israelis in. It appeared to some that the basic reason for Egypt's presence in Ghana was to stop the Israelis. The counter argument was that Egypt's diplomacy dictated that it react to the aggressive nature of Israel in Ghana. The truth of the matter was that Nasser was anxious to get on with inter-African affairs. In this he saw both Ghana's Nkrumah and his overall role in the Arab world as a vital link in the chain of a successful policy.

As Nkrumah became closer to Egypt his relationship with Israel became strained. Although the technical aid given by Israel had been useful; the overall strategy of Avriel had allowed for too much Israeli autonomy in Ghana. Furthermore, Nkrumah was not at all pleased with the general attitude taken by the Israelis on the limited role he wanted them to play in his country. It was as if the Israelis were attempting to set up their own colony in the heart of Accra. Once Nkrumah realized this, he switched his policy toward a normalization process with Egypt and the Arab world. According to Mr. Yarden, Secretary of the Israeli Mission to the United Nations, Nkrumah had every right to be alarmed by the Israelis. For Mr. Yarden admits: "Our fellows went on a rampage in Ghana. Nkrumah woke up one morning to find Israelis all over the place running the country—that is when he decided to normalize things a bit."¹⁸

¹⁸Decalo, Israel and Africa: The Politics of Cooperation, p. 103.

The pattern was clear, after 1960, Nkrumah's attitude toward the Israeli aid programme in Ghana had become lukewarm. Efforts towards ridding Ghana completely of the Israelis were not attempted; however, Nkrumah sought to align himself closer to the Arab world and this move altered the Israeli campaign in Africa.

By 1962, Nkrumah's policies toward Israel had gone full circle. Stopping short of dismissing the Israelis from Ghana, Nkrumah aimed toward closer unification of African nations and the exclusion of Israel.

Finally, it can be stated that Israel and Egypt fulfilled different functions in Nkrumah's strategies. No matter how much Nkrumah's thoughts evolved, concerning the State of Israel, Ghana had instituted too many ties with Israel for the relationship to be altered overnight. Nor were the Israelis prepared to stand by silently as political links weakened.

Israel was somewhat dismayed that by 1960, Ghana had replaced its products with those from Egypt. Madam Fathia Nkrumah was doing her part by inaugurating a new Egyptian/Ghanaian air service.

While Ghana had been relatively quiet in the United Nations on questions that concerned Israel by 1963, with most of the Israelis removed from Ghana, Israel began to worry about Ghana's position on the Middle East. To the Israelis thinking, Nkrumah could venture into the world of U. N. resolutions and make comments that would further compromise Israel's ties with Ghana. After the Iraqi crisis in early 1963, Nkrumah could not resist speaking out on the Middle East. Alarmed over the "grim possibility of the re-establishment and strengthening of neo-colonialism in the Middle East";¹⁹ Nkrumah opted for a Palestinian State in the Middle

¹⁹Thompson, Op. cit., p. 285.

East. Moreover, he commented that Israel should be kept within the limits laid down by the United Nations and should not be allowed to advance its territory in the Middle East.

Throughout the latter part of his rule, Nkrumah played a two-sided hand in the Middle East. Accepting Israeli aid on the one hand; while on the other he sought to counter Israeli influence in Africa. Of course, this divergent policy came after the Israelis had well established themselves in all of Africa. Yet, it must be understood that Nkrumah's first priority was the development of Ghana. His failure in this manner was his shortsightedness on the real nature of Israeli aid and his inability to stop the Israelis from advancing in all of Africa.

It has been speculated that Nkrumah wished to be an African mediator for the Middle East conflict. However, his early policies toward Israel spoke to a pro-Israeli or at best a neutralist position on the question. Realizing that Israel's interest in Ghana ran farther than setting up technical assistance programmes, Nkrumah altered his policy toward Israel's role in the Middle East in general and Israel's position in Africa in particular.

CHAPTER V

UGANDA AND ISRAEL: 1963-1972

On October 9, 1962, Uganda became an independent nation within the commonwealth of nations. On one of her good-will trips to East Africa in February of 1963, the Israeli Prime Minister, Golda Meir visited Uganda and set up a technical aid agreement with the new nation.

There were three basic aspects of Israeli technical aid to Uganda. These consisted of courses in Uganda, courses in Israel, and the provision of experts from Israel to Uganda.¹

The Israelis offered one year upgrading courses in agriculture, specially organized for Ugandans in Israel. Twenty-three students went in 1963 and a further 25 in 1965. Uganda contributed only the cost of travel. This factor was not a rarity for Israel. The Israelis always made it much easier for the recipient country to send its citizens to Israel rather than for them to export large numbers of Israelis to the developing nations. Only rarely have criticisms been voiced in African legislatures to this lopsided manner of financing the Israeli experts in Africa. As a high official of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs remarked on one occasion:

There have been a few rare criticisms by irresponsible elements in African nations, spurred by foreign economic and political interests, but seldom has there been a complaint by an official

¹Hal Mettrick, Aid in Uganda: Agriculture (London: Overseas Development Institute, Ltd., 1967), p. 83.

organ. The fact remains that though our experts are not for free the Africans are taxing our resources with their requests for more and more of them.²

The Ugandan government made it quite clear from the outset that Israeli aid was desirable in that country. In 1963, the Uganda Minister of Interior and Defense declared that Israel was the only country to which Uganda was looking for aid: "We believe that your country has more to offer us than highly developed countries in the West," he stated.³

By 1964, Israel had firmly cemented its technical aid programme with Uganda. During that year, places had been made available for Ugandans in agriculture and agricultural engineering at a technical high school in Israel. Six Ugandan students were chosen to undertake the course. Non-academic courses were also provided in Israel in poultry, fertilizers, water irrigation and vegetable production. Up until 1965, over 60 Ugandans had taken four to six months courses in this area.

Another factor of Israeli aid to Uganda was that the Israeli government arranged courses in Uganda. As a result, explained the Israelis, of their receiving immigrants from backward rural communities, they felt particularly qualified in agricultural extension work. Four instructors were provided to give three courses for 30 people each in 1963 in agriculture and one course for 60 people in 1965 in animal husbandry.

Experts were provided to advise on cooperatives, poultry and citrus production. In order to develop its citrus production, Uganda had modeled its production after Israel. A feasibility survey was first of all made

²Decalo, "Israel and Africa: The Politics of Cooperation," p. 232.

³Ibid., p. 218.

by an expert from Israel, and on the basis of his report a citrus grower was sent to Uganda to establish a pilot project.

The Israelis seemed to feel that contacts at the technical level would demonstrate the value of normal relations at the political level. They showed a preference for programmes that could reach fruition fairly quickly and that require at the outset minimal resources on the beneficiary's part.⁴

Military Aid

Speaking to the very nature of the military in Africa, Ruth First has commented that despite the great wave from colonial to independent government, there remained a continuity between the old dependence and the new. "The armies are colonial products. . . ."⁵ Indeed, very few will argue against the fact that the military in Third World nations were developed for the security and stabilization of European colonialism and most definitely not for the protection of African societies. In this context, Israel rushed to set up a strong military assistance programme in Uganda.

As early as 1963, (less than one year after independence) 15 Ugandan army officers and five pilots had been trained in Israel. This move was the initial step taken by Israel in training the Ugandan army. Again in 1964, Israel offered military assistance to the newly established Ugandan air force (and police air wing). Israel subsequently sent two IAI Fouga-Magister jet trainers to the pilot schools at Entebbe and Jinja. After

⁴Laufer, Op. cit., p. 32.

⁵Ruth First, Power in Africa (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970), p. 27.

that, Uganda received four additional Magisters for a total of six in their air arm.⁶ In 1968, Israeli Air Force officers were training Ugandan pilots at the Entebbe school.

As in the case of Ghana, Israel took over the job of training the Ugandan military. By 1965, a number of officers and men equal to one battalion had been trained in Israel. As a political force, Israel indicated a willingness to assist Uganda in its efforts to halt the incursions by Sudanese rebels, but the Ugandans repeatedly declined.⁷

Israeli military and technical assistance was originally invited into Uganda under the leadership of Uganda's first President, Milton Obote.

Milton Obote

On February 22, 1969, Prime Minister Milton Obote announced that he had assumed "all the powers" of the government of Uganda. Prior to this time, Obote had done extensive travelling on the African and Asian continents discussing methods whereby Africans could effectively deal with the eradication of imperialism on the continent.

On February 13, 1965, Obote charged that Congolese planes, supplied by the United States had bombed two villages in Uganda. He further charged that the U. S. was trying to set up puppet governments in Africa. A clear example of what he called neo-colonialism. Obote further remarks that "If America thinks she can rule the world by violating others' territorial

⁶Silverburg, Op. cit., p. 75.

⁷Ibid., p. 75.

integrity and independence she is not a democracy, she is ruled by gangsters prepared to disturb world peace."⁸

In May of that same year, Obote disclosed that Yugoslavia and Communist China had made promises of loans and gifts to Uganda totaling 25.2 million. Two months later, while on an official visit to the People's Republic of China, he talked with Chairman Mao tse-Tung and Head of State Liu Shao-Chi. Obote revealed that Uganda would open an embassy in Peking before the end of 1965 and further reiterated his ambitions for the end of imperialism. In sum, Obote was making friends with the sworn enemies of Western imperialism and was consistently moving Uganda towards the "socialist camp" in its development. The results of such behavior were to prove fatal to the Obote regime.

Sworn in as President of Uganda on April 15, 1966, Obote accelerated his pace to expel and expose imperialism and capitalism in Uganda. Under his rule, Obote had wished to bring the Ugandan economy under stronger state control. Thus, by 1969, he issued a "Common Man's Charter", which proposed tighter state control of the economy and, if necessary, nationalization of production and distribution. Commenting on the very nature of the "Common Man's Charter", Obote stated that the move to the left involved a new political culture and a new way of life whereby the people as a whole are paramount. He also warned that it was dangerous to allow a widening gap between the rich and poor in Uganda. According to Obote, the move to the left did not represent a strong ideological shift but it did reflect two things. First an attempt to bind together the different Ugandan tribes,

⁸ New York Herald Tribune, February 14, 1965.

peoples and religions into a nation and secondly, the recognition that economic progress in isolation is not necessarily a desirable goal, particularly if it is achieved at the expense of political independence.⁹

Uganda was moving forward towards the goals of equal distribution of national income and economic and social development for the total nation. "In short", comments one author on Uganda, "Uganda has been having an industrial escalation that would eventually move the society into a new material culture. . . ."¹⁰ Expectations were heightened in July 1970, when the Minister of Mineral and Water Resources, Mr. M. L. Chandry, told Parliament in Kampala that, "Rich deposits of very high quality vermiculite magnetite, iron, columbite, tantalite, salt and tin had been discovered in different parts of Uganda. Copper, diamonds and wolfram were also being suspected in parts of Karimoja."¹¹

On the whole, the entire sphere of the Uganda economy was prospering for the total population. By May 1, 1970, President Obote had announced a government takeover of certain sections of the Ugandan economy. The areas which were to take immediate effect, included the nationalization of the import and export trade, with the exception of imports of oil and petroleum products. The government acquired a 60 percent share in all manufacturing and plantation industries, banks, oil companies, and the Kilembe copper mines. Obote said that the various measures he was announcing were those necessary for the promotion of Uganda's new political

⁹"Uganda," Deadline Data on World Affairs, 1972, p. 35.

¹⁰Pete M. Gukiina, Uganda: A Case Study in African Political Development (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1972), p. 157.

¹¹Ibid.

culture as set out in the Common Man's Charter.¹²

To merely state that Western powers were unhappy with the "progressive nature" of the Obote regime is an understatement. What the results of this disapproval would mean can only be traced to the alleged clear-cut plan on the part of these powers with the direct help of the Zionist State to topple the Obote government.

Idi Amin and the Ugandan Coup

Serving as Army Commander Brigadier, Idi Amin Dada, a British trained officer, stressed that the armed forces were strongly behind President Obote and had no ambition for a political role.

Initially, Amin's relations with Obote were close. He was an attractive army commander because, like Obote, he had northern tribal origins, and in fact one of Amin's four wives was from Obote's tribe. Throughout his military career, Amin avoided politics and was virtually unknown to the United Nations and diplomatic groups in Kampala, the nation's capital. But as Obote moved to the left, Amin's conservative views put him at odds with the President.

Subsequent efforts by Obote to draw tribal groups together and consolidate the armed forces behind the national policy also served to heighten support for Amin, who up until this time was calling for "reform" in government. Basically, the pro-Amin theory is that Dr. Obote had ordered Lango and Acholi troops, those of proven loyalty to Obote, to disarm and shoot if necessary, all other soldiers.¹³ Amin, was supposedly

¹²"Uganda," Deadline Data on World Affairs, 1971, p. 37.

¹³Norman N. Miller, Military Coup in Uganda, American Universities Field Staff, East Africa Series, Vol. X, No. 3 (April, 1971), 5.

included on the list of those to be shot. This theory points to long-festering tribal animosities within the Ugandan army.

However, the total disenchantment that Obote felt for Amin soon became public. Even worse were the attempts by Obote to weaken the General's power; which were viewed in Ugandan circles as unpopular. When the situation deteriorated to an apparent overt move to get rid of Amin, it was the General's friends in the military who tipped the balance. Uganda's enlisted men and NCO's essentially seized power and handed it to the General.

Therefore, on January 25, 1971, the Ugandan army units under the command of Major General Idi Amin seized control of the government in the absence of President Obote. Obote, who was attending the Commonwealth of Nations Conference in Singapore at the time of the coup, was granted asylum in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania. Kampala radio announced that the army had taken power because it was thoroughly dissatisfied with Obote's economic policy and with corruption and tribalism in government.

The day after the coup, soldiers of the Armed Forces broadcasted the reasons why they took over the country. These included such things as civil violence, high taxes and the total lack of political freedom and expression. The broadcast then continued:

For the reasons given above we men of the Ugandan Armed Forces have this day decided to take over powers from Obote and hand it to our fellow soldier Major General Idi Amin Dada and we hereby entrust him to lead this our beloved country of Uganda to peace and goodwill among us.

We call upon everybody. . .to continue with their work in the normal way.

For the moment a curfew is necessary . . .

Power is now handed over to our fellow soldier, Major

General Idi Amin Dada, and you must await his statement which will come in due course.

We have done this for God and our country.¹⁴

By February 2, Amin announced that as military head of state he had assumed all powers formerly held by the President and the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. Diplomatic recognition from reactionary African nations and the Western powers followed within a matter of days.

Israel and The Coup

Dr. Obote, speaking from Tanzania on the day after the Coup announced that the takeover had been manned by foreigners and he accused Israel of being involved.¹⁵ To counter the accusation an Israeli government spokesman in Jerusalem strongly denied that his country was involved. "This is absolute nonsense, Israel has never interfered in the internal affairs of any country", he said.¹⁶

Israel's compliance in the Coup, as charged by Obote was continuously denied by both Israel officials and those close to the new Ugandan regime. However, facts bear out that there was, in the first three days after the Coup, heavy reliance on Israeli advisers by Ugandan soldiers.

One observer of the situation claimed to have first hand knowledge of the direct involvement of Israel in the Ugandan Coup. Peter Anyang' Nyong' O, stated that he witnessed Israeli embassy cars carrying soldiers into the town of Kampala soon after the 'Coup' and Israeli military personnel cruising with the leader of that reactionary 'Coup' into the

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 1-2.

¹⁵"Uganda: Coup d' etat," Africa Research Bulletin, Vol. 8, January, 1971, p. 1995.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 1995.

Makerere Campus.¹⁷

It might be suggested in passing that the Israeli aid to the military in Uganda had indeed proved to be self-serving for the Israelis on the one hand and the entire imperialist bloc on the other. Touching at the very heartstrings of European domination, Amin announced that he would remain in the Commonwealth of Nations. He further delighted Great Britain and other Western powers in stating that his government would slow down the previous government's plan for nationalization of industry and commerce.

Amin consolidated his position with the Israelis by promising his support for continued Israeli presence in Uganda. For it has been reported that:

While the Ugandan government in the United Nations and elsewhere followed the Organization of African Unity in its policies toward the Middle East conflict, Amin insisted that his junior officers be trained in Israel. He insisted that the Israeli instructors and advisers be retained by the army and air force.¹⁸

While visiting Tel Aviv in July 1971, President Amin talked with Israelis about expanding Israeli development and military aid in Uganda. It was generally understood that Amin was mainly interested in increasing the effectiveness of the air force.

Reactions to the coup from African nations were diverse. Pro-Western nations such as Liberia, Malawi and the Ivory Coast wasted no time in applauding Amin in his successful overthrow of the Obote regime. On the

¹⁷Peter Anyang' Nyong' O. "The Impact of the Palestine and Arab Israeli Conflict on African Orientations and Behavior," Paper presented at the Sixth Annual Convention of Association of Arab American University Graduates (Washington: 1973), p. 20.

¹⁸Lumer, Zionism, pp. 46-47.

other hand, responses from "progressive" African nations were to the contrary. President Nyerere of Tanzania strongly condemned the seizure of power by Amin and stated: "This is an act of treason which impedes the African progress towards independence, and which, if allowed to consolidate itself, could weaken Uganda's national independence, and the strength of this whole region at a time when even a fool is aware of the need for Africa to unite in a battle against colonialism and racialism."¹⁹ President Sekou Toure of Guinea stated that the Guinean Government was "angry at the actions by elements in the service of imperialism The satisfaction voiced by imperialist powers through their press is proof of their complicity."²⁰

Up until February, 1972, the honeymoon between Amin and Israel was at its best. However, events after this period were to alter the entire scope of Israeli aid to Uganda on the one side and to all of Africa on the other.

Amin and the Expulsion of the Israelis

By February, 1972, Amin's attitudes towards the Israelis had turned full circle. Amin informed the Israeli ambassador to Uganda that the government had received allegations that Israelis in Uganda had been spreading anti-government propaganda. He also informed them that he had uncovered a plot by the Israelis to establish contacts with former President Obote and his followers. Consequently, Amin announced that existing

¹⁹ "Uganda: Coup" . . . , Africa Research Bulletin, p. 1995.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 1996.

Israeli-Ugandan Agreements (trade, development and military) would not be renewed. He ordered all Israeli military advisers to leave Uganda before March 27. On March 30, he closed the Israeli embassy in Kampala. Amin stated that the government had uncovered an anti-government plot which involved top-level Ugandan officers and Israeli agents.²¹ On the exodus of the Israelis from Uganda, Amin distinguished himself by openly applauding Hitler's slaughter of six million Jews in Germany.

In the final analysis, it is somewhat difficult to assess Amin's change in attitude towards the Israelis. On one account, Amin was not the pawn that the Israelis felt he could be in Africa. In other words, the Israelis were looking for forces in Africa which they could directly use to their advantage: Idi Amin was not that force.

Another reason for his actions could have been his background. Amin is a devout Moslem. And while it became clearer to him that Israeli aid could be replaced by Libyan or Egyptian aid, the Israelis failed to realize this factor.

A third factor, which is of equal importance, was the overall attitude that African leaders were beginning to take in regards to Israel and the Middle East War. While in the past, African nations regarded the Middle East as an "outside matter", after 1967 Israel was viewed in African eyes as "the aggressor" in the conflict.

The Beaumont Enterprise, gives an interesting account of what could have been a fourth reason behind General Amin's expulsion of the Israelis. According to Arthur Gavshon, the situation involved the British, the Israelis and Amin:

Israeli and British diplomats tell a surprising story about

²¹"Uganda," Deadline Data, p. 32.

the tempestuous ruler of Uganda, Maj. Gen. Idi Amin.

The onetime national boxing champion who has become a dictator asked each of those countries for the planes, tanks and guns he needed to conquer neighboring Tanzania.

Both the Israelis and the British—who were among his best friends when he ousted Milton Obote as president 27 months ago—refused what they considered to be a wild request.

And so, in his own good time, he turned on them, the diplomats say.²²

Explaining that Amin had never forgiven the Tanzanians for giving asylum to Obote; Gavshon goes on to discuss that Amin was building up his arms for a confrontation with the Tanzanians.

Among Amin's requests to the Israelis and the British was one for the American-built Phantom jet fighter, which no Ugandan is trained to fly.²³ From the British he wanted combat jet aircraft to enable him to bomb Dar-es-Salaam.²⁴

At any rate, any one or a combination of the above reasons, could have been directly behind Amin's decision to get rid of the Israelis. After all, Uganda served as a model for African nations wishing to dismiss imperialist aggressors from the continent. From 1972 up until the present time, the Israelis are being dismissed from African nations at a rapid rate. Although not acclaiming their disapproval of the Israelis at the level that General Amin has done, many African leaders have turned their backs on the trade and aid that was once lavished upon them by the Zionists.

²²Arthur Gavshon, "Uganda's Unpredictable Ruler Turns Against Old Friends," Beaumont Enterprise, September 28, 1972, p. 3-D.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

There are three distinct factors which become evident after an analysis of the Israeli aid programmes to Ghana and Uganda in particular and to the Third World in general.

1. There were significant differences in the approaches used by Israel in Ghana as opposed to Uganda. In other words, distinct roles were played by Ghana and Uganda in Israel's policy formation for Africa.
2. A large level of stabilization was given to Israel's foreign relations with Third World nations while she was dispensing aid to Africa.
3. African nations' total rejection of Israeli aid in the early 1970's reflected negatively on the total image of Israel in the Third World.

First of all, it should be understood that Ghana and Uganda played different roles in the Israeli foreign policy structure. True, both nations were viewed as strong "African allies," but as Israel began to push her pro-Zionist propaganda in Africa her position began to change vis-a-vis most African states.

In the case of Ghana, Israel's primary goals were at the outset political and economical. The mere fact that Ghana, the first African state to gain independence from colonial rule had turned to Israel for advice and assistance was an occurrence the significance of which was not lost to most Africans. In addition, after the Israeli consulate in Ghana was elevated to the level of embassy; it became Israel's first embassy in

all of Afro-Asia and only the eighth maintained by Israel abroad.¹

It appears certain that Ghana's close relations with Israel afforded the Zionists a political partner and a forum, both of which were needed in Africa. Israel was more than happy to show her appreciation for the close ties and consistently showered Ghana with one of the most extensive aid programmes ever to be established in Africa. The Israelis treated Ghana to the cream of its technical aid crop. And the Ghanaians reciprocated by giving Israel its calling card to Africa. Consequently, when the Ghanaian delegation to Israel arrived in Tel Aviv, the Israeli press hailed the delegation and commented:

The visit comes like the sudden discovery of a fresh spring of the cool water of common sense and practical idealism in the barren desert of prejudice, irrational hates and blind-alley politics which vitiates so much that could be hopeful in the international scene at the present time.²

Israel then, it appears, was concerned with gaining political allies in Africa. When Ghana opened the doors the Zionists hurriedly shoved their way through. What the Ghanaians and in particular Nkrumah came to finally realize was that they had not merely opened the doors for Israel to Ghana, but to the rest of Africa as well.

The economic aspects of Israeli penetration into Ghana have been cited in the body of the study. However, Israel's general concern for trading partners outside the Western world became manifested in finding friends in Africa. Hence, the Ghana Construction Company and the Black Star Line all proved extremely profitable to Israeli businessmen.³

¹The others were in the United States, Soviet Union, France, United Kingdom, Canada, Italy and Argentina.

²Jerusalem Post, July 15, 1957. Cited in Decalo, "Israel and Africa: The Politics of Co-operation," p. 103.

³The Black Star Line was (on occasion) allowed to pass through the

As regards Uganda, Israel's motives were not clear. There is still nothing concrete to prove that the Israelis directly overthrew the Obote regime. Reports are conflicting, however, it does appear that the Israelis did play a role.

One could speculate that Israel was serving Western imperialism by attempting to oppose Obote and his supporters. However, even this theory is not well grounded in empirical information. But the implications still remain. The Israelis were not playing a strong political role in Uganda as they had done in Ghana. Milton Obote was not Kwame Nkrumah and the Israelis were cognizant of this fact.

On the other hand, Uganda was both Israel's blessing and its downfall. While no one has seriously attempted to analyze the multifaceted personality of Idi Amin, the Israelis soon came to realize that Amin was not the force that they were searching for to alter possible Arab and Soviet elements in Africa.

Israel's campaign in Africa afforded her a period of stability which was necessary for both her image and survival vis-a-vis the Third World. While on the one hand, Arab states were calling for the general boycott of Israeli goods; African nations refused to oppose their newly found mentor. Israel realized this and rushed to set up aid programmes with every nation in sub-Saharan Africa.

Subsequently, Africa was seen in Israeli circles as a force which could also bring direct negotiations between Israeli and the Arab states. Africa became not only an end in itself, but also a very valuable means

the Suez Canal. Even though the Line was partially owned by Israel.

to yet another end—peace in the Middle East.

Noting that the friendship between Israel and African nations served a useful purpose, David Ben Gurion (Israel's first President) stated that it was:

. . . important and necessary in itself because of its effects on Israel's international position, but it can also bring about the weakening and collapse of the Arab wall of hate, and finally pave the way for a pact of peace and co-operation between Israel and the Arabs.⁴

On an economic footing, Israel's Ministry of Commerce and Industry announced the government's intention to actively encourage the formation of viable export companies aiming their activities at Afro-Asia. The stated purpose of the move was to help private and public corporations to gain footholds in Africa and Asia, opening up new markets for Israeli products.⁵

According to Decalo, "a large amount of the capital needed to finance both the industrialization and the diversification of the Israeli economy must come from abroad."⁶ Therefore, serving as a spring board for its foreign economic ventures and to possibly curb pro-Arab feeling in Africa, the Israeli aid programme offered Israel a period of stability in her world relations which might not have been otherwise afforded to her.

Alternative means of aid can and must be sought for Africa. For African nations must realize the true interests and nature of the Zionist

⁴David Ben Gurion, Israel's Security and Her International Position Before and After the Sinai Campaign. (Jerusalem: Government Printer, 1960), p. 20.

⁵Decalo, Israel and Africa: The Politics of Co-operation, p. 28.

⁶Ibid., p. 30.

State. As Maxime Rodison has sought to establish

Israel is a colonial-settler state that is in the same category with other colonial-settler states in Africa, which states are oppressing African peoples and depleting their resources. Africa cannot seek to ostracize Rhodesia while she condones the wickedness of Israel against the Palestinians.⁷

In the final analysis, Israel's strong period in Africa (1959-1971), was cemented by the image that many African leaders held of Israel. African states had viewed with sympathy what they saw as a small state struggling to survive. Israel was linked with Afro-Asia and was considered by many Africans as part of the Third World.

After the 1967 War, 12 Black African states voted for a United Nations resolution condemning Israel as the aggressor, 16 voted in support of Israel and 5 remained neutral.⁸

By 1973, the situation for Israel had deteriorated. After the October 1973 war, almost all of the nations in Sub-Saharan Africa had broken diplomatic ties with Israel.⁹ The basic reason for this move was the image that Israel was beginning to have in Africa. That being:

The survival of Israel became identified with American power. To be opposed to Israel was to be anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist.¹⁰

African defection from Israel is seen also as a result of Arab pressure and money. Libya, for example is reported to have promised Uganda

⁷Maxime Rodison, Israel: A Colonial-Settler State? (New York: Monad Press, 1973), p. 54.

⁸"Israel and the African States," Africa Digest, Vol. XXXI, No. 1 (January, 1974), p. 1.

⁹This list included such formerly warm friends of Israel as Ethiopia, Nigeria and Kenya.

¹⁰"Israelis Say Black Africans Begin To Regret Breaking Ties," New York Times, February 17, 1974, p. 4.

military and economic assistance.

Once these ties were broken, Israel proclaimed that African leaders had been misled and that these nations regretted breaking ties with Israel. In an article written in the New York Times on February 17, 1974, Israeli officials were quoted as stating that Black African nations were beginning to have second thoughts about having broken diplomatic relations with Israel.

As of the present time, none of the 29 African countries have shown signs of renewing relations with the Zionist state. Although the Israelis offered to renew relations with any government that asked, no new embassies are being opened or old ones reopened in Africa. The Israelis are anxious to return to African nations and admitted that if asked back into these nations they would return. Foreign Minister Abba Eban commented: "If we go back into Africa, we want to be active, not just sit there and show the flag."¹¹

This statement is evident of the fact that the curtain on Israeli aid in Africa cannot be drawn. It is also evident of the political nature of Israeli aid and of the possible consequences for African states which seek this aid.

However, the analysis contained in this thesis, it is hoped, has shed some light on the dangers involved in that very dim concept known as "aid". Although the work might not be inclusive, it makes a first step toward defining the relationship between the nature of Israeli aid and the impact of that aid on Africa. In sum, this study has attempted to raise some very

¹¹ Ibid., p. 4.

pertinent questions on the nature of foreign aid in general and the total realm of Israeli aid to Africa in particular.

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